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THE GENERAL  ELECTION of May 1979 in the United Kingdom ushered 
into power a Conservative administration whose monetary and budgetary 
policies differed quite markedly from those of its predecessors, both in 
objectives and in the means for achieving them. The macroeconomic ob- 
jectives of the present government have been stated clearly. In a letter to 
the House of Commons Treasury and Civil Service Committee in Feb- 
ruary 1980,  the Chancellor of the Exchequer wrote:  "The main objec- 
tives of the Government's economic strategy are to reduce inflation and 
to  create  conditions  in  which  sustainable  economic  growth  can  be 
achieved."1 It was also emphasized that, in contrast to previous Labour 
and Conservative administrations, the  use  of  incomes  policy  was  not 
viewed as the appropriate way to check inflation. 
A central plank of the new government's platform was to strengthen the 
supply side of the economy. This was to be achieved through fiscal mea- 
sures (primarily a switch from taxes on labor income to taxes on spend- 
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1.  Memoranda  on Monetary  Policy  and Plublic Expenditiure, House  of  Commons 
Treasury and Civil Service Committee, sess. 1979-80  (London: Her Majesty's  Sta- 
tionery  Office,  1980), pp. 3-5. 
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ing and on oil rents and a reduction in public expenditure),  by restoring 
"a broad balance of power in the framework of collective  bargaining  "2 
(measures to remove specific abuses in picketing and the closed  shop) 
and by other measures aimed at encouraging market forces to work as 
freely and flexibly as possible  (such as the abolition of price, dividend, 
and exchange controls).  Privatization of some nationalized industries and 
a general reduction in industrial intervention were also on the agenda. 
Bringing down the rate of inflation was seen as a precondition for a return 
to higher employment. The short-term stabilization of  output, employ- 
ment, and external current account was deliberately de-emphasized. 
The policy of the Thatcher government was revealed clearly in the two 
budgets enacted in the first year of office. The  Conservative party had 
promised to reduce the "standard rate" of income tax in its election cam- 
paign, and this commitment was promptly fulfilled in its first budget of 
June 1979 when the standard rate was reduced by 3 percentage points.3 
The top rate was also reduced from 83 to 60 percent and the tax brackets 
considerably widened. However, to offset the impact on the budget deficit 
of these tax cuts aimed at the supply side, the rate of indirect taxation was 
increased, with the standard rate of value added tax rising from 8 percent 
to 15 percent and the rate on luxuries from 121/2 percent to 15 percent. 
In a bold gesture the government also abolished exchange, dividend, and 
price controls in its first budget. 
The government also "rolled forward" the money-supply targets that 
it had inherited from the previous Labour government. The target range 
for the growth of the broad money supply, sterling M3, was reduced from 
8 to 12 percent to 7 to 1  1 percent at an annual rate. 
Another inheritance from the Labour government that the Thatcher 
administration did not abandon was the commitment to implement wage 
settlements determined by the Pay Comparability Commission for certain 
employees in the public sector: the rate of these settlements, together with 
those for other public sector employees, led to an increase of earnings in 
the public sector that was to total 25 percent over the year to  1980:3. 
With the retail price index rising by 4 percentage points as a direct result 
of the indirect tax increases in the budget, settlements in the private sector 
2.  Ibid., p. 5. 
3. The standard rate is the initial marginal rate of income tax, which persists 
over a wide range of  income; this rate stood at 33 percent when the government 
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continued at a rapid pace, with the basic weekly wage rate for manual 
workers increasing by 19.2 percent in the year to 1980:3,  for example. 
The government renounced all recourse to incomes policies as a way 
of  heading off the inflationary surge. Instead,  in  its  second  budget of 
March 1980 it chose to launch what was called the medium-term financial 
strategy (MTFS).  This consisted of a four-year declining target path for 
the growth of a broad monetary aggregate (sterling M3)  and a supporting 
path for the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR)  which, among 
other features, involved a progressive decline of the government's deficit 
relative to GDP. While annual monetary targets had been in operation in 
the United Kingdom since December  1976,  the MTFS did constitute a 
major innovation. In  a memorandum to  the Treasury Committee, the 
Treasury explained: "The Government has deliberately not set its targets 
in terms of the ultimate objectives of price stability and high output and 
employment because these are not within its direct control. It has instead 
set a target for the growth of money supply, which is more directly under 
its influence, and has stated that it will frame its policies for taxation and 
public  expenditure to  secure a  deceleration  of  money  supply without 
excessive reliance on interest rates."4 
This, then, was Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's experiment: the 
rate of wage settlements would be determined by market forces operating 
within a framework of demand-management policies that were to achieve 
a particular intermediate nominal objective announced in advance; the 
operation of market forces was to be assisted by policies  reducing the 
rate of direct taxation and the volume of government spending-measures 
it was hoped would favorably affect the supply side of the economy. The 
combination of real output growth and wage-price inflation that might 
emerge in attaining the nominal target was to be left for forces within the 
economy to determine.5 
4.  Memoranda  on Monetary  Policy,  House  of  Commons  Treasury  and Civil Ser- 
vice Committee,  sess. 1979-80, vol. 2 (HMSO, 1980), p. 9. 
5. The strategy is not unlike the "credible threat" strategy advocated for the 
United States by William Fellner in "The Valid Core of Rationality Hypotheses in 
the Theory  of  Expectations,"  Journal  of  Money,  Credit  and Banking,  vol.  12, pt. 2: 
"Rational  Expectations"  (November 1980), pp. 763-87. Thus far, the Fellner strat- 
egy has not been fully embraced in the United States. Unlike Mrs. Thatcher, Presi- 
dent Reagan has not publicly committed his government to pursue relentlessly a 
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The immediate and thus far main result of the Thatcher policies has 
been a major loss of competitiveness accompanied by a large decline in 
production and rise in unemployment-a  slump so severe we refer to it as 
a depression. After an initial increase, the rate of inflation has come down 
steadily and has stabilized recently at about 11 percent a year. Any posi- 
tive supply-side effects that may have resulted from the government's fis- 
cal measures are both hard to identify because of  the slump in output 
and employment and unlikely to be exploited as long as the depression 
lasts. 
To understand the genesis of the depression it is necessary to recognize 
the importance for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy of the 
openness of the United Kingdom, both in trade and in financial trans- 
actions. Our view of  this mechanism is strongly influenced by Rudiger 
Dornbusch's article in which he focuses on the interaction of an "efficient" 
foreign exchange market dominated by forward-looking speculators (pos- 
sibly endowed  with  rational expectations),  with  disequilibrium in  the 
domestic labor market in which the behavior of money wages is character- 
ized by a significant degree of inertia.6  We attribute this nominal inertia as 
much to institutional features of the labor market such as the nature of 
labor contracts and the importance of  relative wages or differentials- 
features that we expect to remain to a large extent invariant under the 
kinds of policy regime changes the Thatcher government tried to imple- 
ment-as  to the presence of nonrational expectations in the labor market.7 
Despite the increasing degree of unionization of the labor force in the 
United Kingdom after World War II, the process of collective bargaining 
in private industry is decentralized, staggered, and fragmented, which may 
account for some of the inertia. Thus, while in 1930 only 25 percent of 
the work force was in trade unions, by 1978 this had doubled to 54 per- 
cent, with particularly large growth during the previous decade and with 
6.  Rudiger  Dornbusch, "Expectations  and Exchange Rate Dynamics,"  Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 84 (December 1976), pp. 1161-76. 
7.  It is, however, logically possible to attribute  the marked difference in the re- 
sponse of the exchange market and the labor market to differences in the degree of 
credibility attached to the policies by the participants  in these markets while main- 
taining a Walrasian, market-clearing,  view of both sets of markets. This is another 
example of ad hoc specifications  of information  sets and ad hoc specifications  of the 
wage-price mechanism generating observationally equivalent behavior of  macro- 
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half of all union members belonging to  (postentry) closed shops. More- 
over,  single-employer  agreements have  replaced  earlier industry-wide 
agreements concluded by employers' associations and trade unions. In 
today's environment, "the driving force behind pay increases in the private 
sector is coming from companies that possess considerable market power 
and below average sensitivity to changing conditions in the labour mar- 
ket."8 In unions, too, there is decentralization with powerful local shop 
stewards but no  authoritative central trade union  council.  It is  worth 
noting that during the two decades since 1960 there have been very few 
periods when an incomes policy of some form was not in operation to 
check the inflationary potential of the wage-bargaining system.9 
In the past decade, public sector pay has ceased to be a passive part of 
the national pay structure, and significant changes in the relative pay of 
public and private employees have occurred.'0 Although the public sector 
contains roughly 30 percent of all employees and has ultimately one em- 
ployer, the government, there is no consistent policy for determining pub- 
lic sector pay. Some groups are indexed to  average earnings; some are 
offered "comparability" with analogous private sector employees; others 
are subject to cash limits or to the play of market forces. We argue that 
the initial failure to control the increase in public sector pay was one of 
the important factors that kept inflation high despite the restrictive mone- 
tary policy pursued by this administration. 
In an open economy with a freely floating exchange rate, a high degree 
of international capital mobility, and inertia in the behavior of  money 
wages, tight money will result in an immediate, large appreciation of the 
exchange rate. Since sluggish domestic costs do not exhibit the same flexi- 
bility, the jump in the nominal exchange rate also represents a jump in the 
real exchange rate-a  sudden loss of competitiveness. Basically, restric- 
tive monetary policy  raises current and anticipated future real interest 
rates at home vis a vis those in the rest of the world. The real exchange rate 
jumps because it is a function of the entire current and anticipated future 
8. William Brown and Peter Nolan, "The Context of the Next Incomes Policy," 
Policy Studies,  vol. 1, pt. 3 (January 1981), p. 141. 
9. S. G. B. Henry and P. A.  Ormerod, "Incomes Policy and Wage Inflation: 
Empirical  Evidence  for  the  U.K.,  1961-77,"  National  Institute  Economic  Review, 
no. 85 (August 1978), p. 32. 
10. Brown and Nolan, "The Context of the Next Incomes Policy," p. 142. 320  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1981 
path of real interest rate differentials." This short-run behavior of the real 
exchange rate has been referred to as real exchange rate "overshooting" 
because no long-run adjustment of the real exchange rate is required in 
response to monetary policy changes and other monetary disturbances.'2 
Real  exchange rate overshooting  results from current reductions in 
monetary growth, from credible announcements of future reductions in 
monetary growth, from current or anticipated future reductions in the 
level of the money stock, and from increases in indirect taxes. It is the 
asymmetry in the speed of response to "news" between the foreign ex- 
change market (or financial markets in general)  and the labor market 
that causes current and anticipated future developments in policy  (and 
other exogenous shocks)  to be reflected immediately in the exchange rate 
but only gradually in domestic wages. 
As time passes, the overshooting gradually disappears, thus reducing 
both the output costs associated with the loss of competitiveness and the 
immediate anti-inflationary benefits from the sharp initial exchange rate 
appreciation. 
In an economy like the United Kingdom's the exchange rate is viewed 
as a major link in the transmission mechanism of monetary and fiscal dis- 
turbances, operating along with the familiar channels in a closed economy 
such as nominal and real interest rates and other explicit or implicit rates 
of return, Tobin's q, wealth effects, cash-flow effects, and liquidity effects. 
This does not mean, however, that it is necessarily the external compo- 
nents  of  aggregate demand-exports  and imports-that  are primarily 
affected by tight money, at least not initially. The well-documented lags in 
the effect of competitiveness on exports (but not on new orders),  which 
11. With perfect capital mobility and risk neutrality, the relation is especially 
simple. Let r be the domestic nominal interest rate, r* the world interest rate, e the 
log of the spot price of foreign exchange, and p and p* the logs of the domestic and 
foreign price level, respectively;  a circumflex ( A )  over a variable indicates its ex- 
A.  A.  A.-  A.  A.  A.  pected  value.  From  e=  r  -  r*  one  obtains  e  +  pi  -  p-  (r  -  P)  -(r*  p). 
This implies that e(t)  + p'(t)  -p(t)  =  f  [(r(z)  -p(z))  -  (r*(z)  -p*(z))]  dz. 
12. See Dornbusch, "Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics"; Willem H. 
Buiter and Marcus Miller, "Monetary Policy and International Competitiveness: 
The Problem of Adjustment,"  Oxford Economic Papers, Supplement: The Money 
Supply and the Exchange Rate, vol. 33  (July 1981),  pp. 143-75;  and Buiter and 
Miller, "Real Exchange Rate Overshooting  and the Output Cost of Bringing Down 
Inflation,  " paper presented  at the International  Seminar  on Macroeconomics,  Paris, 
June 18-19, 1981 (rev. August 1981), forthcoming in European Economic Review. Willem H. Buiter and Marcus Miller  321 
give rise to the J-curve, and the reluctance of exporters to reduce sales in 
response to a perceived transitory loss of competitiveness mean that the 
monetary transmission mechanism in an open  economy  may show  up 
primarily in inventory adjustments. 
In  the next  section  we  present a profile of  the  depression.  This  is 
followed  by an analysis of monetary policy with a review of the theory 
and practice of monetary control in the United Kingdom, a closer look at 
the government's medium-term financial strategy, and an assessment of 
the degree to which monetary policy has been restrictive. Fiscal policy is 
then discussed as is the influence of  exogenous  shocks  and the role of 
North Sea oil.  The  conclusion  offers a tentative balance  sheet for  the 
Thatcher experiment. 
A Profile of the Current Depression 
In 1980 the economy of the United Kingdom entered the deepest slump 
since the Second World War. So pronounced has been the contraction of 
economic  activity that current developments bear comparison with the 
onset of the Great Depression after 1925, as illustrated in figure 1. 
The present downturn is much deeper than that being experienced by 
other industrial countries, as can be seen by comparing the GDP for the 
United Kingdom and the Organization for Economic  Cooperation and 
Development  (OECD).  While the annual growth rate of real GDP for 
the OECD as a whole slowed to 1.2 percent in 1980, that is, 2.3 percen- 
tage points less than the average growth experienced over the preceding 
decade, real GDP fell by 1.7 percent in the United Kingdom that year, a 
performance that is almost 4 percentage points below its average over the 
preceding decade. A similar relative performance appears likely in 1981.13 
PRODUCTION,  AGGREGATE  DEMAND,  AND 
DEMAND  COMPONENTS 
As shown in table 1, real GDP began its slide at the end of 1979. Pre- 
liminary indications are that as of July-August  1981 the decline of real 
13.  National  Institlte  Economic  Review,  no.  97  (August  1981),  p.  35,  in which 
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Figure  1. Comparison  between  1925-35 and 1975-81,  Selected  Indicators- 
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Sources: Based on  the figure presented in the Nationial  Inistitute  Econoinic  Review, no.  95 (February 
1981), p. 7. Data for  1925-35  are from C. H. Feinstein, Nationial  Ihzcomne,  Expeniditure  anid Output  of  the 
United Kingdom, 1855-1965, Studies in the National Income and Expenditure of the United Kingdom 6 
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United Kingdom, Central Statistical Office, Econiomic  Trenids, no. 334 (August 1981), pp. 6, 28, 36. 
a.  The estimate of GDP (on the output measure)  for 1981 is the average of the first two quarters  (value of 
104.0); the estimate of manufacturing output for 1981 is the average of the first three quarters (value of 
89.1); the estimate of unemployment  for 1981  is the average  of the first ten months (value of 10.4).  These data 
are from Econiomic  Trenids, no. 337 (November 1981), pp. 6, 26, 36. 
b.  In the 1925-35 period the unemployed of the civilian working population, including work temporarily 
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GDP has stopped. Between 1979:4  and 1981:1  real GDP fell 4.7 percent 
measured by  the  average estimate.'4 The  decline  in  nonoil  GDP  was 
larger over that period, amounting to 6.9 percent. As usual, industrial pro- 
duction was affected disproportionately, with total industrial production 
and nonoil industrial production falling by 13.2 percent and 15.3 percent, 
respectively,  between  1979:4  and  1981:1.  Manufacturing production 
fell by 17.1 percent during the same period. 
The behavior of the major components of aggregate demand is given 
in table 2, which shows that the ?2,786  million decline in real GDP be- 
tween 1979 and 1980 is arithmetically more than that accounted for by a 
turnaround in  inventory  accumulation  of  ?3,499  million.15  Inventory 
liquidation continued through 1981: 1. As a result of the massive destock- 
ing, the inventory-production and inventory-sales ratios have returned to 
levels close to their historical trends. 
Public consumption spending grew moderately at about 2 percent from 
1979 to  1980,  and for 1981 it also appears as though the government's 
plans to reduce real public consumption will not be achieved.'6 Consumer 
expenditure also proved remarkably resilient. This can be related to  a 
significant rise in real disposable personal income, which more than offset 
a high personal saving ratio. 
Fixed capital formation (private plus public)  grew through 1979 but 
turned down from the beginning of 1980. The growth of public consump- 
tion stands in sharp contrast to the dramatic decline in capital formation 
in the public sector, primarily by general government but also by the pub- 
lic corporations. There appears to have been for many years a firm and 
successful bipartisan commitment to reduce investment in social overhead 
capital. General government capital formation was  19 percent lower in 
1981:1  than it had been a year earlier.'7 The corresponding decline in 
investment by public corporations was 5.4  percent. 
Real exports, after being surprisingly buoyant through 1980: 1, turned 
downward after an unprecedented loss  of  competitiveness. Import vol- 
umes had risen sharply between 1978 and 1979, producing a ?2.9 billion 
decline in the real trade balance. On a quarterly basis, imports peaked 
14. Average of output,  expenditure,  and income measures. 
15. By the expenditure  measure. 
16. This spending is public expenditure  on goods and services other than public 
sector capital formation and inventory accumulation. 
17. United Kingdom, Central Statistical Office,  Economic  Trends, no. 333 (July 
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by mid-1979 and declined sharply after 1980:2,  reflecting the influence of 
the depression in general and of inventory liquidation in particular. 
UNEMPLOYMENT  AND  LABOR  PRODUCTIVITY 
As can be seen from the seventh column of table 1, unemployment has 
been on a rising trend since the first oil shock of 1973-74;  but the increase 
has been dramatic during the slump, with the unemployment rate reach- 
ing 10.4 percent in 1981 :2, double what it was in 1979:3. 
Real GDP  (average estimate)  rose by  1 percent a year between the 
two peak years of  1973  and 1979.  However, this growth in production 
understates the conventional estimates of the potential growth rate of the 
economy-unemployment  was twice as high in 1979  as it was in 1973. 
(Below we use an estimate of  13/4  percent as the annual growth of poten- 
tial GDP from 1979 on.)  As output has fallen from 1979 to 1980, output 
per person also declined but only by 0.9 percent.18 Until the beginning of 
1981 the ratio of the shortfall of GDP below trend and the unemployment 
rate was broadly in accordance with what is known as "Paish's ratio," the 
equivalent of Okun's law for the United Kingdom. On the basis of the 
experience of the 1970s this predicts that the increase in the unemploy- 
ment rate will be about half of the percentage increase in the gap between 
potential and actual GDP.19 Since the beginning of  1981,  however, the 
rise in the unemployment rate has been much greater than would have 
been predicted on the basis of past relations. 
Both labor productivity and unemployment are higher in 1981 than the 
United Kingdom equivalent of Okun's law would predict. This fact could 
be due to either or both of two developments. First, there may have been 
a step increase in the cyclically adjusted level of productivity in the econ- 
omy of the United Kingdom as a result of current policy; second, the sort 
of labor hoarding that lessens measured productivity in a recession may 
have ceased as firms gave up hope of a quick recovery. 
18. Output per person employed in manufacturing fell  by 4 percent in  1980, 
much more than that for the economy as a whole. Part of the difference may come 
from the increase of part-time  hours worked in manufacturing  and the lack of over- 
time; hours worked per production worker fell by almost 3 percent between 1979 
and 1980. 
19.  Frank  W.  Paish,  Studies  in an Inflationary  Economy:  The  United  Kingdom, 
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The government is inclined to stress the first of these two explanations, 
citing an increase in labor productivity in 1981: 1, while output was still 
falling, as preliminary evidence of a new dawn of greater efficiency and 
productivity. However, its own cautious forecasts for the future path of 
GDP would certainly give support to the second view: why should firms 
that believed the Chancellor's assumption that GDP would only rise 1/2 
percent a year from 1980 to 1983 hoard labor?20 
WAGES  AND  PRICES 
Although reducing the rate of inflation was the overriding priority of 
the incoming  Thatcher government, some  of  its  own  policies  initially 
worsened  the  inflation problem.  The  incomes  policy  pursued by  the 
Labour government broke down in the course of  1978  and the pace of 
wage settlements increased sharply, as can be seen from the second col- 
umn of table 3:  the rate of increase of basic  (manual)  wage rates over 
the year to 1978:4  was 18.1 percent, compared with 5.4 percent the pre- 
vious year. In an attempt to obtain industrial peace during the "winter of 
discontent" that followed the breakdown of its incomes policy, the Labour 
government committed itself to large increases in public sector wages, 
some of them to be phased in during 1979. During the election campaign 
in early 1979  the Conservatives promised that they, too,  would honor 
these commitments. 
The result was disastrous for the anti-inflationary policy and for the 
attempts to control public spending and the PSBR: in the 1979-80  finan- 
cial year public sector earnings rose 25 percent and, for employees of the 
central government, wages rose over 30 percent.21  Such settlements were 
higher than those in the private sector, but the index of earnings for the 
economy as a whole still rose by 21.4 percent in the year to 1980:2. 
In the second half of  1980  the government announced that the Pay 
Comparability Commission, which had been setting the pace for public 
sector settlements, would be abolished; it suspended the pay agreement 
for 1981  affecting 550,000  white-collar civil servants, a move  adopted 
by the previous government during the two phases of its incomes policy 
20.  United  Kingdom,  Finiancial Statemenit anid Budget  Report,  1981-82  (HMSO, 
1981),p.  17. 
21.  See  National  Inistitute Economic  Review,  no.  95  (February  1981),  p.  11. 
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Table 3.  Wage and Price Inflation, 1973-81 
Percent change per yeara 
Average  Basic  Real 
earnings,  weekly  Retail  Tax and  consump-  Real 
Year  and  whole  wage  price  price  GDP  tion  product 
quarter  economy  ratesb  index  index  deflator  wage'  waged 
1973:4  12.5  11.8  10.3  n.a.  8.3  1.5  3.5 
1974:4  25.4  26.6  18.2  n.a.  22.1  8.4  4.5 
1975:4  21.6  26.1  25.3  n.a.  24.4  0.8  1.7 
1976:4  12.3  13.9  15.0  n.a.  11.9  -1.1  2.0 
1977:4  8.9  5.4  13.0  n.a.  10.8  -7.6  -5.4 
1978:4  13.8  18.1  8.1  n.a.  10.8  10.0  7.3 
1979:4  18.5  15.5  17.3  14.9  16.0  -1.8  -0.5 
1980:4  19.5  16.3  15.3  16.4  17.5  1.0  -1.2 
1979:1  13.9  19.8  9.6  6.6  9.7  10.2  10.1 
2  13.4  12.1  10.6  13.8  12.1  1.5  0.0 
3  15.7  12.8  16.0  14.1  14.1  -3.2  -1.3 
4  18.5  15.5  17.3  16.9  16.0  -1.8  -0.5 
1980:1  19.7  17.6  19.1  17.6  17.6  -1.5  0.0 
2  21.4  19.2  21.5  17.4  19.2  -2.3  0.0 
3  22.2  19.2  16.4  17.3  18.8  2.8  0.4 
4  19.5  16.3  15.3  16.4  17.5  1.0  -1.2 
1981:1  16.5  12.5  12.7  13.5  14.8  -0.2  -2.3 
2  13.0e  9.9  11.7  15.3  n.a.  -1.8  n.a. 
Source: Econtomic  Trenids, no. 334 (August 1981), pp. 5, 6, 40, 42, and similar tables in preceding issues. 
n.a.  Not available. 
a.  Percent changes are from same quarter one year earlier. 
b.  Manual workers. 
c.  Change in the basic weekly wage rate minus change in the retail price index. 
d.  Change in the basic weekly wage rate minus change in the GDP deflator. 
e.  Provisional data. 
of  1975-77.22  It also announced that cash limits for local authorities in 
1981-82  would only include provision for  a 6  percent increase in the 
wage bill. 
It was the rate of increase of prices that the new administration made 
the target of its policy, and the index commonly utilized for measuring 
price  inflation in  settling  wage  bargains is  the  increase  in  the  retail 
price index over the past twelve months shown in the third column of 
table 3. The rate of inflation on this measure increased sharply in the third 
quarter of  1979 as a direct consequence of the 7 percent increase in the 
22.  After a protracted  dispute, the civil servants settled for 71/2 percent in mid- 
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value added tax in the June budget of that year, which was estimated to 
have added about 4 points to the average level of prices. This increase 
stayed in the "inflation  rate," as measured by the year-over-year change in 
the retail price index, for a whole year. Given the convention of effectively 
indexing annual pay claims for past inflation and the tendency to use re- 
cent inflation as a guide to future inflation, there can be little doubt that 
the increase of the value added tax in June 1979 helped to keep the pace 
of settlements at a high level in the subsequent pay round.23 
The government actually cut direct taxation by enough to maintain the 
real value of the after-tax wage and hoped that wage settlements would 
not attempt to make up for the increase in value added taxes. To help 
make this point, the government in August 1979 introduced the tax and 
price index, which shows how much gross earnings would need to be in- 
creased to compensate for changes in market prices and direct taxes. This 
measure showed no marked jump after the June 1979 budget, but it was 
launched too late to moderate the 1979-80  wage round. Furthermore, in 
the fall of the following year the tax and price index was rising faster than 
the retail price index and has continued to do so. 
The retail price index was also being pushed up by the increase in world 
oil prices. As with other developments that boosted consumer prices, en- 
ergy price increases accelerated the whole wage-price spiral. In equilib- 
rium, maintaining production and high employment after an energy price 
increase would require a reduction in unit labor and capital costs. How- 
ever, real wage targets in bargaining, together with the refusal of the gov- 
ernment to cut taxes in line with its expected North Sea revenues, have 
prevented such a reduction of real wage costs. 
After the first oil shock in 1973-74,  the incomes policy of the Conser- 
vative government was challenged by the coal miners, and when an elec- 
tion was called, the government was voted out of office. There followed a 
veritable wage explosion  that raised real wages by 8.4 percent in  1974 
and pushed the annual inflation rate, as measured by the GDP deflator, 
well above 20 percent. The Labour government's incomes policy, which 
began in the fall of 1976, slowed wages more than prices, and real wages 
lost the gain achieved in the previous two years. With the breakdown of 
incomes policy, however, real wages rose by 10 percent in 1978 and have 
changed little through mid-1  981. 
23.  De  facto  indexing occurred despite the  absence of  formal cost-of-living 
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THE  CURRENT  ACCOUNT,  COMPETITIVENESS, 
AND  THE  EXCHANGE  RATE 
One of the most striking aspects of the current depression is the col- 
lapse  of  the  international competitiveness  of  the  United  Kingdom,  as 
shown in table 4. The loss of competitiveness during 1979  and 1980 is 
about 50  percent when measured by the International Monetary Fund 
indexes of relative unit labor costs,  and this is mirrored, though more 
modestly, by other indexes.24  North Sea oil, together with the rise in world 
oil prices, may have contributed to the appreciation of sterling and the 
loss of competitiveness. But the restrictive monetary policy of the govern- 
ment was probably even more important. Both of these effects are dis- 
cussed below. 
The  21.6  percent  increase  in  the  effective  exchange  rate  between 
1979:1  and 1980:4  and the 46.2 percent loss of competitiveness, as mea- 
sured by relative normalized unit labor costs, together imply that, far from 
compensating for  international inflation differentials over  this  period, 
movements in the effective exchange rate compounded the divergence of 
domestic and foreign costs.25 
The large deterioration in cost competitiveness, as measured by rela- 
tive normal unit labor costs, was evidently absorbed to  a considerable 
extent by exporters squeezing their profit margins so as to limit their loss 
of price competitiveness in international markets. The unit value index for 
manufactured exports, measured in sterling, rose only 16.8 percent from 
1979: 1 to 1980:4, while the GDP deflator rose by 32.1 percent and wage 
and salary costs per unit of output in manufacturing rose by 36.6  per- 
cent.26  Exports were maintained relatively well, while inventories and pro- 
duction were cut back. 
Thus, although the loss of competitiveness was one of the major proxi- 
mate causes of the depression, it did not operate primarily by lowering 
24.  Between 1979:  1 and 1980:4 relative export prices increased  by 21.4 percent; 
relative wholesale prices rose by 30.0 percent;  the index of import  price competitive- 
ness worsened by 11.1 percent; and the relative profitability  of exports deteriorated 
by 5.9 percent. See Economic  Trends,  no. 333 (July 1981), p. 46. 
25.  By October 1981, when the pound had fallen to 1.82 U.S. dollars, its effective 
rate had declined by some 14 percent from its peak in 1981:1. Cost inflation in the 
United Kingdom since then has probably been near the average elsewhere, so this 
depreciation  will constitute a substantial  recovery of competitiveness  since 1981:1. 
26.  Economic  Trends, no. 333 (July 1981), pp. 6, 40. Willem H. Buiter and Marcus Miller  331 
Table 4.  Trade Competitiveness of the United Kingdom and Sterling Exchange Rates, 
1975-81 
International 
Monetary  Fund 
index of relative 
unit  labor  costs,  Sterling  effective 
Year  and  niormalized  Sterling-dollar  exchange  rate 
quarter  (1975  =  100)  exchange rate  (1975  =  100)- 
1975  100.0  2.220  100.0 
1976  93.6  1.805  85.7 
1977  89.9  1.746  81.2 
1978  97.9  1.920  81.5 
1979  113.0  2.122  87.3 
1980  138.9  2.328  96.1 
1979:1  102.4  2.016  82.4 
2  112.0  2.081  87.0 
3  118.7  2.234  91.3 
4  119.0  2.157  88.5 
1980:1  126.4  2.254  93.0 
2  136.0  2.286  94.5 
3  143.4  2.382  96.7 
4  149.7  2.387  100.2 
1981:1  156.2  2.309  101.4 
2  n.a.  2.077  97.8 
Source:  Ecotionoic  Trends,  no.  334  (August  1981),  pp.  46,  50. 
a.  Index combining the exchange rates between sterling and  seventeen other major currencies with 
weights derived from the International Monetary Fund's multilateral  exchange rate model. 
export demand during the 1978-80  period. As table 2 shows, real exports 
of goods and services rose in 1979 and rose slightly further in 1980,  al- 
though they were declining after the first quarter of that year. Real im- 
ports did surge in 1979, although most of the increase preceded the steep 
appreciation of sterling. Imports declined in 1980, but by then it is diffi- 
cult to allow for the effects of the depression in the United Kingdom so as 
to identify the effects of competitiveness. 
The  current account  moved  sharply from deficit into  surplus after 
1980:2.  There was even the unusual phenomenon  of  a surplus on the 
visible trade balance.27  It would be superficial to attribute this simply to 
27. The Civil Service dispute has interrupted  the publication of  trade figures 
since early in 1981. Data available for September 1981 show a dramatic rise in im- 
port volume, a rise in export volume, and a virtual disappearance  of the surplus  on 
visible trade. Too much significance should not be attached to one month's trade 
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the rapid growth of  domestic oil production and the movement of  the 
United Kingdom into oil self-sufficiency. The current account is the bal- 
ance between total output and total absorption and is not related in any 
simple and direct way  to  changes in the production of  any particular 
traded commodity. The combination of the growing volume of oil produc- 
tion and the low "propensity to absorb" of the British government, the 
major single beneficiary from oil revenues, does create a tendency toward 
current account surplus. However, most of the improvement in this period 
can be attributed to the unprecedented severity of a depression charac- 
terized by massive inventory liquidation. 
Monetary Control in the United Kingdom 
A central feature of the Thatcher government's economic policy is con- 
trol of  the growth rate of  money.  For  this purpose,  the  chosen  inter- 
mediate monetary target is sterling M3, a fairly broad aggregate consisting 
of notes and coins in public circulation, together with all sterling bank 
deposits, including certificates of deposit, held by residents of the United 
Kingdom in both the public and private sectors. The government has been 
frustrated in its attempt to control sterling M3 despite the fact that mone- 
tary policy, as we argue below, has been very restrictive. In order to ex- 
amine why this is so, we explain the nature of the sterling M3 aggregate 
in the British financial system and the way it responds to monetary policy 
and economic developments. 
About 60 percent of sterling M3 consists of interest-bearing deposits, 
the rates on which are determined by banks in competition with other 
financial institutions. For such a broad definition of money it is not the 
level of interest rates in general that affects the demand for money but 
rather the differential  between rates available on nonmoney assets and 
those paid by banks. On the assumption that the rates banks charge their 
loan customers are close to those prevailing elsewhere and that bank mar- 
gins are kept narrow by competition, one would not expect this interest 
differential to be much affected by the level of interest rates. Hence for a 
competitive banking system the demand for broad money will appear to 
be relatively inelastic with respect to the general level of interest rates. The 
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encouraged the  banking system  to  compete  aggressively for  deposits, 
found it necessary to check such competition two years later by introduc- 
ing supplementary special deposits. Under this scheme, banks were re- 
quired to hold noninterest-bearing deposits at the Bank of England if the 
growth in the interest-bearing element of their deposits exceeded defined 
limits. The proportion of  the marginal excess  deposits that had to  be 
lodged at the Bank of England rose to a maximum of 50 percent as a bank 
moved further into the penalty zone. This scheme, popularly referred to 
as the "corset," was in force when the Conservative administration took 
office in June 1979.  In its second budget, however, the Chancellor de- 
creed that it should be  scrapped in June 1980  because the authorities 
believed the corset scheme caused disintermediation, the "cosmetic" con- 
trol of the chosen monetary target being achieved without effective control 
over underlying monetary conditions. 
The  argument that financial institutions in  competition  with  banks 
would  have a powerful incentive to  create substitutes for the deposits 
subject to such direct controls is reminiscent of similar objections to regu- 
lation Q in the United States. In the British case it came to be described 
by "Goodhart's law," after Charles Goodhart of the Bank of England, 
which asserts that when the authorities attempt to control any monetary 
total, the activities of the financial system in creating substitutes will so 
affect its demand and supply that its behavior will cease henceforth to 
reflect accurately the course of banking business. 
The Conservative administration was acutely aware of this criticism- 
a Lucas critique of methods of monetary control-since  the effect of re- 
moving exchange controls in 1979 had been to open up a loophole  for 
banks to evade the corset by sending business offshore (just as U.S. banks 
could  evade regulation Q by  routing business through the Eurodollar 
market).  The abolition of the corset resulted in a dramatic increase in 
sterling M3-both  absolute and relative to the other aggregates-with 
reintermediation adding about 4 percent to sterling M3. This was more 
than the Bank of England had expected, and such a large increase in the 
indicator chosen to show the underlying rate of monetary growth was em- 
barrassing to the government. 
In 1980 the Treasury and the Bank of England published a consulta- 
tion paper, Monetary Control, which concluded that the principal meth- 
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scheme would be the level of interest rates and the public sector borrow- 
ing requirement.28  Control over interest rates would be achieved by open 
market operations, especially in Treasury bills and-until  mid-198 1-by 
varying the minimum lending rate, which is the minimum rate at which the 
Bank of England lends cash to the market. Control over the PSBR would 
be  achieved by varying taxes  and expenditures. Broadly speaking, the 
proposed methods of control were seen as operating primarily on the de- 
mand for credit from the banking system, both by the authorities and by 
the private sector, rather than on the demand for bank liabilities  (de- 
posits). Thus to understand how the methods of control were expected to 
work, we must consider the asset side of the banks' balance sheet in addi- 
tion to the deposit side. 
Sterling M3 can be written as sterling M3  = notes and coin +  sterling 
deposits of the United Kingdom residents. The balance sheet of banks in 
the United Kingdom can be shown as 
Liabilities  Assets 
Sterling deposits  of  residents of  the  Sterling lending to the United 
United Kingdom  Kingdom private sector 
Sterling deposits of overseas  Sterling lending to the public sector 
residents  Sterling lending to overseas 
Foreign  currency deposits  residents 
Nondeposit  liabilities  Foreign  currency lending 
This implies 
A sterling M3  A_  A  notes and coin +4  A sterling  lending to the United King- 
dom public and private sector 
+  A sterling lending to overseas residents 
-  A overseas residents' sterling deposits  -  A foreign 
currency deposits net of foreign currency  lending 
-  A nondeposit liabilities. 
Combining these with the financing identity for the government sec- 
28. Monetary Control, a consultation paper by the Treasury and the Bank of 
England,  presented  to Parliament  by the Chancellor of the Exchequer,  Cmnd. 7858 
(HMSO, 1980). Willem H. Buiter and Marcus Miller  335 
tor29 (for  whom  government borrowing from  the  banks is  a  residual 
source of finance covering borrowing needs not met overseas or by the 
nonbank private sector), we obtain an equation accounting for the change 
in sterling M3 from the asset side as follows: 
A sterling M3 _  PSBR -  sales of public sector debt to United Kingdom 
private nonbank sector 
+  A bank lending (to  United  Kingdom private sector 
and overseas residents) 
+  net external flows30 
-  A banks' nondeposit liabilities. 
More compactly, combining the first three terms on the right-hand side, 
A sterling M3 _  domestic credit expansion 
+  net external flows 
-  A banks' nondeposit liabilities. 
We  agree with Artis  and Lewis  in  their observation:  "This simple 
framework . .  . now forms the basis of monetary control, and of public 
discussion of it, in Britain. Because DCE  [Domestic Credit Expansion] 
relates to the asset, or lending side, of the banks' balance sheet, the Bank 
[of England] is able to satisfy those who argue that bank credit and not 
the money supply should be the focus of policy, since the target subsumes 
it. Moreover, because  the  PSBR,  gilt  sales  and external flows  can be 
identified with fiscal policy, debt management, and exchange rate policies 
respectively, the framework shows the interrelationship of  the various 
arms of economic policy."'31 
29. The financing  of the PSBR is expressed  as 
PSBR =  A notes and coin +  sales of public sector debt to the United Kingdom 
private  nonbank  sector 
+  external  finance  of the public  sector 
+  A sterling  lending  to public sector by the banking  system. 
30. Net external flows _-  external finance of public sector -  A overseas resi- 
dents'  sterling  deposits  -  A foreign currency  deposits  net of foreign currency  lending. 
31.  M. J. Artis and M. K. Lewis,  Monetary  Control  in the United Kingdom  (Lon- 
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Table  5. Changes  in Sterling  M3 and  Its Components,  Financial  Years  1978-79 
through  1980-81a 
Millions of pounds  sterling 
Public 
Public  sector 
sector  debt  sales  Increase  Increase 
borrowing to private  Increase  Domestic  Net  in non-  in 
require-  nonbank  in bank  credit  external  deposit  sterling 
ment  sector  lendingb expansionc  flowsd  liabilities  M3e 
Period  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
1978-79  9,199  8,534  6,778  7,443  -951  -1,043  5,449 
1979-80  10,474  9,138  9,874  11,210  -2,743  -1,347  7,120 
1980-81  13,145  10,840  12,947  15,252  -3,153  -1,482  10,617 
Source: Economic Trends,  no. 334 (August 1981), p. 54. 
a.  Data are seasonally adjusted. Financial years begin in April of  the first year shown. Sterling M3 
includes notes and coins in circulation plus all sterling deposits, including certificates of deposit, held by 
residents of the United Kingdom in both the public and private sectors. 
b.  Sterling lending to the private sector of the United Kingdom and to overseas residents. 
c.  Column 4 is column 1 minus column 2 plus column 3. 
d.  See note 30. 
e.  Column 7 is column 4 plus columns 5 and 6. 
In table 5 the behavior of the components of sterling M3 is shown for 
the 1978-81  period. How the two instruments of monetary control are 
expected to operate is outlined with references to that table. Leaving aside 
the external factors (to be neutralized by the floating exchange rate)  and 
nondeposit liabilities (bank equity finance),  a rise in short-term interest 
rates is expected to increase sales of public sector debt to the nonbank 
private sector (column 2)  or to check demand for bank lending in sterling 
(column  3).  If interest rates fail to check the growth of sterling M3 in 
this way, it is the government's own borrowing requirement that must be 
reduced (column 1).  As Artis and Lewis observe, however, the results of 
this bank-asset approach to controlling the money supply "have so far 
been disappointing, to put it mildly. Apart from spurts in gilt-edged sales, 
the response of ?M3 to interest rate variations appears slow and uncer- 
tain. By directing attention to each of the components and away from the 
total money supply, the markets tend to react adversely when any one 
component is misbehaving, not appreciating that it may be counteracted 
by one of the other items. In particular, overruns in PSBR targets have 
encouraged the authorities to subsume fiscal policy almost entirely to the 
dictates of monetary control, despite difficulties in containing the deficit 
in the face of rising unemployment."32 
32. Ibid., p. 84. Willem H. Buiter and Marcus Miller  337 
In abandoning the corset scheme that gave them some control over the 
interest differentials that alter the attractiveness of  the interest-bearing 
component of bank deposits, the authorities appear to have relied largely 
on the notion that high interest rates will  control the volume of  bank 
credit by restricting the demand for credit from the banks, both by the 
public and the private sectors. But if one considers the "residual" demand 
for bank credit by the public sector, the very factor that makes the de- 
mand for sterling M3  insensitive to the level  of  interest rates will  also 
make the demand for public sector debt by the nonbank private sector 
interest inelastic: a rise in interest rates will not make public sector debt 
more attractive to the nonbank private sector if rates on deposits also rise. 
Similarly, there is no reason to expect that a rise in the general level of 
interest rates will divert private borrowers to other sources of finance and 
away from the banking system whose rates are by assumption moving in 
line with rates in general. 
In short, varying the level of interest rates is likely to fail to depress 
significantly the rates paid on interest-bearing deposits relative to those 
available on  near-bank deposits,  and to  raise the  cost  of  bank credit 
relative to costs of borrowing elsewhere.33 
Although the two chosen weapons of monetary control do not bear 
differentially on the banks, the effort to control the money supply through 
interest rates will surely have an effect on the flow of investment (includ- 
ing inventory investment),  on the exchange rate, and on the level of in- 
come and prices, and will indirectly affect the demand for money  and 
credit.34  Moreover, discretionary changes in the PSBR will, by changing 
the stance of fiscal policy, surely have effects on the economy and so on 
the demand for money and credit. Rather than the instruments of policy 
controlling the money supply so as to affect prices and output, these in- 
struments have  to  affect the  economy  in  order to  control  the  money 
supply. 
Against the background of this analysis, we now turn to a discussion of 
how policy actually was formulated and how actual developments com- 
pared with the government's plans. 
33. For further discussion see Marcus Miller, "Monetary  Control in the U.K.," 
Cambridge  Journal  of  Economics,  vol.  5  (March  1981),  pp. 71-79. 
34. Indeed, in the current recession, when company profits are badly squeezed 
but personal  real disposable  incomes are not, there appears  to be a rise in the demand 
for credit by companies and for deposits by persons as they recycle the transitory 
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The Medium-Term Financial Strategy 
The  government's medium-term financial strategy was  supposed  to 
integrate fiscal and monetary policy in a particular way. According to the 
MTFS launched in the  1980  budget, inflation was to be  controlled by 
restraining the growth of the broadly defined money supply, sterling M3, 
within an announced target range; but this monetary objective was to be 
achieved "without excessive reliance on interest rates" by adjusting the 
PSBR.35  Thus, although cuts in the level of government spending and in 
direct taxation were planned, fiscal policy, as measured by the PSBR, was 
to be geared to the attainment of monetary objectives and not to stabiliz- 
ing the level of output. 
The government was prepared to announce four years in advance the 
path for the PSBR that it felt was consistent with its plans for monetary 
growth. The  planned  coordination  of  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  are 
shown in figure 2, in which the arrow shows the strategy for reducing both 
monetary growth and the government's borrowing requirement as a per- 
centage of output. 
The upper and lower edges of the box at the left side of the figure show 
the upper and lower limits set for monetary growth. Thus the figure shows 
a range for the targeted monetary growth but only a point estimate for the 
ratio of the deficit to GDP. Because the latter was a "consistent projec- 
tion" and not a target, it would be more accurate to show a range for this, 
too, but none has been published. The government has in fact assigned 
great weight to the published PSBR/GDP  ratios in its conduct of fiscal 
policy, so it is not, we believe, too misleading to portray the monetary and 
fiscal plans in this way. 
As indicated in the figure, the planned link between monetary growth 
and the government's deficit was much tighter than any link that may have 
prevailed in the past. The actual outcome for 1980-81  greatly exceeded 
both objectives, though this by no means implies that monetary and fiscal 
policy were excessively  expansionary, for reasons that are spelled  out 
below. 
The fiscal content of the MTFS lies not only in its plans for the PSBR, 
35.  Memoranda  on  Monetary  Policy,  House  of  Commons  Treasury  and  Civil 
Service Committee, sess. 1979-80, vol. 1 (HMSO, 1980), p. 19. Willem  H. Buiter  and Marcus  Miller  339 
Figure 2.  Monetary  Growth and the Ratio of the Public Sector  Borrowing Requirement 
to Gross Domestic  Product, Initial Plans and Past Performance, 
Financial Years 1963-64  through 1983-84a 
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Table 6. The Medium-Term  Financial  Strategy,  March 1980 Budget  Projections, 
Financial  Years  1979-80 through  1983-84 
Billions  of pounds sterling,  1979-80 prices,  unless otherwise  specified 
Four-year plan 
Indicator  1979-80a  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84 
Range of growth of sterling 
M3 (percent  per year)  13.2b  7.0-11.0  6.0-10.0  5.0-9.0  4.0-8.0 
Public sector borrowing 
requirement/GDP  at 
market  prices  (percent)  4.8  3.8  3.0  2.3  1.5 
Total general  government 
expenditurec  88.7  88.7  86.9  84.5  83.9 
Total general  government 
receipts  78.5  80.3  80.3  82.7  84.5 
Implied  fiscal  adjustmentd  ...  ...  ...  3.0  4.2 
General  government  borrow- 
ing requiremente  10.2  8.4  6.6  4.8  3.6 
Public sector borrowing 
requirement  9.5  7.1  6.0  4.2  3.0 
Source:  United  Kingdom,  Fintancial Statemnetnt  canid  Budget  Report,  1980-81,  tables  5,  6,  8,  9,  pp.  16-19. 
The factor used to convert the data to 1979-80 prices is 1.19 and is based on the average conversion factor 
used in evidence to the Treasury  Committee. See the definition of sterling M3 in table 5, note a. 
a.  Budget time estimates. 
b.  Actual growth of money over the financial year. 
c.  Total general government expenditure equals general government expenditure in cost  terms, plus 
interest payments, less allowances for the special sale of assets for shortfall, plus a national income accounts 
adjustment. 
d.  The extent to which the planned general government borrowing requirement  would allow tax cuts 
or spending increases in 1982-83 and 1983-84. 
e.  Total general government expenditure minus total general government receipts plus implied fiscal 
adjustment. The difference between the general government borrowing requirement  and the public sector 
borrowing requirement  is the amount of public corporation borrowing from the private  sector and overseas. 
but also in the projected paths for government spending and taxation 
taken separately. With cuts of about 1 percent a year in the volume of 
expenditure by the central government and local authorities over a four- 
year period, together with rising revenues from North Sea oil, the govern- 
ment planned to cut the level of direct taxation while remaining within the 
PSBR limits already described. Future income tax cuts are apparently to 
be made only as the flow of taxes on North Sea oil revenues builds up. 
In table 6 we show the details of the MTFS as it was announced in 
1980, revalued to 1979-80  prices.36  The so-called fiscal adjustment is the 
36. The revenue projections are made on the conventional assumption of  con- 
stant indexed tax rates and allowances at current (1980-81)  levels; they basically 
reflect assumptions  about GDP growth. Willem H. Buiter and Marcus Miller  341 
Table 7.  Revised Medium-Term Financial Strategy, March 1981  Budget Projections, 
Financial Years 1979-80  through 1983-84 
Billions of pounds  sterling,  1979-80 prices,  unless otherwise  specified 
Three-year  plan 
Indicatora  1979-80  1980-81b  1981-82  1982-83  1983-84 
Range of growth  for sterling 
M3 (percent  per year)  13.2c  18.  Oc  6.0-10.0  5.0-9.0  4.0-8.0 
Public sector borrowing 
requirement/GDP  at 
market  prices  (percent)  5.0  6.0  4.3  3.3  2.0 
Total general  government 
expenditure  88.8  91.5  91.5  90.0  87.5 
Total general  government 
receipts  78.4  79.5  82.5  84.0  85.0 
North Sea tax revenues  2.3  3.3  4.5  4.8  5.3 
Implied fiscal adjustment  ...  ...  ...  1.0  2.0 
General  government  borrow- 
ing requirement  10.4  12.0  9.0  7.0  4.5 
Public sector borrowing  re- 
quirement  9.9  11.5  8.0  6.5  4.0 
Source:  United  Kingdom,  Finanicial  Statemnenit  and Budget  Report,  1981-82,  tables  5,  6,  7,  8,  pp.  16-18. 
See the definition of sterling M3 in table 5, note a. 
a.  See table 6, notes c through e. 
b.  Budget time estimates. 
c.  Actual growth of money over the financial year. 
amount by which the government believed it could cut taxes or increase 
government spending while still achieving the sort of PSBR levels that 
would be consistent with its planned monetary growth. The PSBR projec- 
tions are given in the last line of the table; they are derived from the bal- 
ance of general government expenditure, allowing for the fiscal adjust- 
ment, together with an estimate of public corporation borrowing from the 
private  sector  and  overseas  residents.  Real  government  expenditure 
planned for 1983-84,  as a proportion of its level in 1979-80,  reveals a 
planned 5 percent cutback. Planned tax receipts, however, are rising by 
more than 7 percent over this interval (although this drops to about 2 
percent if the fiscal adjustment is assumed to take the form of tax cuts). 
In table 7 the revised MTFS as presented in the March 1981 budget is 
shown, with the expected revenues from North Sea oil and gas now ex- 
plicitly given. As can be seen by comparing tables 6 and 7, the plan for 
1980-81  to keep real government spending steady was not fulfilled, as 342  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1981 
real spending rose by about 3 percent, and the revised plans for 1983-84 
raised the target level of government spending by about 4 percent. On 
the other hand, tax receipts for 1980-81  failed to grow as expected; in- 
stead of increasing by 2.3 percent, they grew by 1.4 percent in real terms. 
The end-of-period projection for taxes is also revised upward by slightly 
less than 1 percent. But with the smaller fiscal adjustment-that  is, with 
less scope for additional tax cuts or spending increases in future years- 
the rise in taxes net of the adjustment is expected to be considerably larger 
than before, an increase of 5.9 percent by 1983-84  in real terms.37  Since 
the GDP forecast for 1983-84  was reduced by about 1.5 percent between 
the two budgets, the expected increase in the ratio of taxes to GDP will be 
even more marked. The taxes include a growing volume of receipts from 
North Sea oil that is expected to increase from 2.3 billion pounds sterling 
in 1979-80  to 5.3 billion pounds in 1983-84  at 1979-80  prices. 
As a consequence of the overshooting of the PSBR target in 1980-81 
and the revisions already described, the PSBR is expected to be 2 percent 
of GDP in 1983-84  instead of 1.5 percent as before. The monetary target 
ranges are left intact, but because these are expressed as growth rates and 
the money supply overshot its target in 1980-81,  starting from the new, 
higher base leaves the monetary target higher than before. 
THE  MONETARY  SQUEEZE 
The role played by restrictive monetary policy is central to our inter- 
pretation of the current depression. We believe  that the authorities in- 
tended financial factors to be restrictive, that this was widely appreciated 
by operators in financial markets, and that the authorities succeeded in 
what they intended despite the overshooting of the broad money-target 
range, which some observers cite as evidence that monetary policy has 
been lax. 
The four-year declining target range for sterling M3 shown in table 6 
documents the government's intentions to  have  a restrictive monetary 
policy. Expectations obviously cannot be documented directly but it was 
the virtually unanimous opinion of financial analysts and commentators 
in 1979-80  that the incoming government was committed to a policy of 
37.  Projected 1983-84  receipts of  85 billion pounds sterling minus the fiscal 
adjustment  of 2 billion pounds are 5.9 percent above the level of receipts  of 78.4 bil- 
lion pounds shown for 1979-80 in table 7. Willem H. Buiter and Marcus Miller  343 
bringing down inflation through monetary restraint. Although the Chan- 
cellor planned to achieve his monetary targets "without excessive reliance 
on interest rates," the minimum lending rate was raised in June 1979 and 
again in November  1979,  reaching 17 percent, which was almost three 
points higher than the yield on twenty-year government bonds. The  10 
percent rise of the effective exchange rate of sterling during 1980  was 
cited as an indirect indication of tight financial conditions by the Bank of 
England.38 
Broader evidence that monetary policy was, in fact, restrictive is found 
in the growth rate of the narrower monetary aggregates, in real interest 
rates confronting business, and in general indicators of  financial strin- 
gency in the business sector. 
Table 8 shows how narrowly defined real money balances, measured 
by  Ml  or by  the  monetary base,  have  contracted  sharply ever  since 
1979:3.  These real declines came as policy slowed growth in the nominal 
aggregates while inflation continued and, indeed, rose as a consequence 
of the rise in value added tax, the wage explosion,  and the rise in oil 
prices. Real sterling M3 also contracted in the initial quarters of the new 
government, but started growing again after mid-1980. 
Various nominal interest rates in table 9 show how the Bank of England 
raised the minimum lending rate sharply in late  1979  and how market 
rates rose with it; but then the bank brought rates down quite promptly 
in late  1980,  despite the overshooting of the sterling M3  target at that 
time. However, when the 1981-82  target was overshot, monetary policy 
let interest rates increase substantially, and Treasury bill  rates rose to 
more than 15 percent by October 1981. 
The  "real" interest rates that correspond to these developments de- 
pend on who is paying them and for what purpose. Various measures of 
price increase are compared in the last four columns of table 9. The rate 
of increase of the retail price index, shown in column 4, includes the in- 
crease in the value added tax, which does not accrue to private firms. A 
better idea of inflation from the supplier's point of view is the GDP defla- 
tor at factor cost, shown in column 6. But even subtracting the rise in the 
GDP deflator from the interest rate gives a misleading impression of real 
borrowing costs for the nonoil  private sector in the United  Kingdom. 
Given the United Kingdom's rapid move toward self-sufficiency in oil and 
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the importance of  the nationalized industries, much of  the rise in the 
GDP deflator was due to oil prices increases and to the substantial in- 
creases in nationalized industry prices shown in column 5.  The export 
unit-value index in the United Kingdom, shown in column 7, illustrates 
the behavior of prices actually received by internationally exposed firms. 
It is because of relatively low price increases like these that many firms 
have had to absorb sharply increasing sterling wage costs and the high 
nominal interest rates shown in the first column: by this measure, mone- 
tary policy has certainly been restrictive. 
The financial difficulties that confronted the business sector as a con- 
sequence of the restrictive policy and the business slump it induced are 
evident in a range of financial measures. Industrial and commercial com- 
panies  (ICCs)  in the United Kingdom experienced a sharp increase in 
their financial deficits and net borrowing requirements in 1979-80.  They 
have had to cut production and inventories, shed labor, and reduce hours 
worked. Statistics on total profits understate the weak profitability of most 
firms because one-third of  all ICC profits in  1980  were attributable to 
North Sea companies.39 
The real profitability of companies aside from North Sea activities, as 
measured by the pretax real rate of return on their trading assets, fell to a 
record low of 2.9 percent in 1980, as shown in table 10, column 7. This 
compares with an average of 5.5 percent from 1974 to 1979, the period 
after the first oil price explosion,  and an average of  10.0 percent from 
1963 to 1973.40 
A similar story is told by the valuation ratio (Tobin's q, the ratio of 
the average rate of return on existing trading assets to the cost of capital, 
both expressed in posttax real terms),  shown in table  10 for all ICCs, 
including  North Sea oil. After dropping sharply below unity in 1974,  q 
reached  a plateau of  approximately 0.9  for  the  three years to  1979, 
but it has fallen sharply in 1980 to the same low level as in 1974, one that 
"represents only a very weak inducement to invest."'41 The liquidity ratios 
and the pace of bankruptcies and liquidations shown in the table also re- 
veal the financial stringency produced by the MTFS. 
The growth targets for sterling M3 over the years since 1976 are shown 
39. See United Kingdom, Her Majesty's  Treasury, Economic Progress Report, 
no. 136 (August 1981). 
40.  Bank  of  Englanid Quarterly  Bulletin,  vol.  21  (June  1981),  p. 228. 
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Table 11.  Targets and Actual Growth of Sterling M3,  1976-82a 
Sterling  M3  Sterlintg  M3 
target  (annual  actual  (annual 
growth  rate,  growth  rate, 
Date target  set  Period  of target  in percent)  in percent)b 
December  1976  Twelve months to April 1977  9_13c  7.2 
March 1977  Twelve months to April 1978  9-13c  15.9 
April 1978  Twelve months to April 1979  8-12  10.9 
November 1978  Twelve months to October 1979  8-12  13.2 
June 1979  Ten months to April 1980  7-11  10.2 
November 1979  Sixteen  months to October 1980  7-11  17.6 
March 1980  Fourteen  months to April 1981  7-11  19.6 
March 1981  Fourteen  months to April 1982  6-10  16.9d 
Sources:  Target  sterling  M3  is from  Memoranda  on  Monetary  Policy  and Public  Expenditure,  House  of 
Commons Treasury  and Civil Service Committee, sess. 1979-80 (HMSO, 1980), p. 6; and United Kingdom, 
Financial  Statement  and Budget  Report,  1980-81  and  1981-82,  p.  16 in both.  Actual  sterling  M3  is from  Banik 
of Enigland  Quarterly  Bulletin, vol.  20 (September and December 1980), and vol.  21 (September 1981), 
table 11.1. 
a.  For a definition of sterling M3 see table 8, note a. 
b.  From seasonally adjusted data. 
c.  The range is consistent with the domestic credit expansion limit. 
d. To August 1981 at an annual rate, as estimated in Batik of England Quarterly  Bulletin, vol. 21 (Sep- 
tember 1981), p. 327. 
in table 1  1, along with the actual growth rates. The incoming government 
reduced the target range from 8-12  percent to 7-1 1 percent in June 1979, 
and then "rolled this target range forward" twice, in November 1979 and 
March  1980.  By  mid-1980,  however,  sterling M3  was  well  above  its 
target range. Although this monetary aggregate was rebased in the March 
1981 budget, it has been exceeding its new target path in the course of 
this year also.42 
The ending of the corset scheme added to sterling M3, and its 18 per- 
cent annual growth rate during the year ending 1981: 1 probably exceeded 
the growth rate that would have occurred without that change by 3 to 4 
percentage points. The two other broad measures of private sector liquid- 
ity grew by well over 13 percent in the same period. Clearly the broader 
aggregates behaved  differently from their narrower counterparts, and, 
somewhat ruefully, the Bank of England noted that the growth of MI was 
"perhaps broadly in line with the path that might have been envisaged 
had there been a formal target for this aggregate."43 
42. However, recent figures are thought to be badly distorted by the civil ser- 
vants' dispute,  with a proportion  of uncollected taxes lodged with the banking  system 
raising  sterling  M3  growth.  See  Bank  of  England  Quarterly  Bulletin,  vol.  21  (Sep- 
tember 1981), p. 327. 
43.  Bank of England  Quarterly Bulletin,  vol. 21  (March  1981),  p. 18. Willem H. Buiter and Marcus Miller  349 
In explaining why sterling M3 has not adequately reflected the strin- 
gency of financial conditions, the Bank of  England commented:  "The 
onset of the recession ...  has had a large effect on the pattern of financing 
in the economy. This change of pattern, probably in part temporary, may 
explain a good deal of the behaviour of sterling M3.  The recession has 
not only enlarged the PSBR but, along with the high exchange rate and 
high wage settlements, has exacerbated the financial difficulties of com- 
panies, particularly those in manufacturing. Personal incomes have bene- 
fited from large wage increases and the high exchange rate, and personal 
savings have grown. Companies have continued to be almost exclusively 
dependent for external finance on the banks-which  have thus provided 
a channel whereby the enlarged surplus of the personal sector has been 
on-lent to companies."44 
Given the ability of the banking system, freed from corset regulations, 
to attract the necessary deposits by competitive interest rates, the Bank of 
England clearly sees the broad monetary aggregates as determined in large 
part by the demands for credit by companies and the government. It ar- 
gues that, far from demonstrating the laxity of monetary policy, the be- 
havior of sterling M3 has reflected the squeeze on the company sector. 
The ICCs, caught between rising wages and a strong exchange rate, which 
prevented them from simply passing on their cost increases, cut back pro- 
duction and borrowed heavily from the banks to finance their borrowing 
needs. The chosen broad money target, whose attainment was meant to 
lead inflation expectations downward and to reinforce the credibility of 
the government's policy, was perversely endogenous, tending to rise as 
companies borrowed to stay in business. 
Fiscal Policy 
The government's desire to control the PSBR means that it has to re- 
spond with changes in spending programs and tax and transfer schedules 
to changes in the level of economic activity that would otherwise alter its 
deficit. In a closed economy such overriding of the automatic fiscal sta- 
bilizers will tend to magnify the response of output to exogenous demand 
shocks. 
44.  Bank of  England  Quarterly Bulletin,  vol.  20  (December  1980),  p. 406. 350  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1981 
For an open economy, in the familiar Mundell model with perfect capi- 
tal mobility, static expectations, a floating exchange rate, and a predeter- 
mined domestic price level, there is no risk of output-destabilizing conse- 
quences from fiscal actions aimed at balancing the budget or from any 
shock to private demand. A shock to aggregate demand leads to a change 
in the exchange rate sufficient to restore the initial level of output, which 
is determined entirely by the money stock. However, the conditions for 
such complete "crowding out" through exchange rate movements are ex- 
treme and unrealistic. Branson and Buiter have recently shown this by 
allowing for the effect of the exchange rate on the general price level and 
thus on the real stock of money balances, for imperfect substitutability 
between domestic and foreign interest-bearing assets, for external wealth 
adjustment through the current account deterioration resulting from a 
fiscal expansion, and for rational expectations in the foreign exchange 
market.45 
With any or all of these modifications to the simple Mundell model, 
varying the level of public spending or changing tax-transfer schedules to 
match variations in the inflow of taxes net of transfers will affect output 
even in an open economy with a floating exchange rate and a high degree 
of capital mobility, although the magnitude of the effect is likely to be 
less than that in a closed economy. Conventional measures of the stance 
of fiscal policy therefore continue to be important in interpreting the be- 
havior of output. 
As shown in table 6, the government planned to keep its expenditure 
constant in real terms in the first year of the MTFS, while increasing its 
receipts by enough to cut the PSBR/GDP  ratio by 1 percentage point. A 
recession was anticipated, so taxes on income and expenditure were not 
expected to be buoyant; rising North Sea oil taxes were expected to con- 
tribute half of the rise in taxes. As table 7 shows, expenditure actually 
grew quite sharply-by  3 percent in real terms-and  taxes proved less 
buoyant than expected, so that the PSBR rose by  1 percent relative to 
GDP. 
The observation that the PSBR overshot its target path and rose rela- 
tive to GDP rather than falling as planned might be taken as a sign that 
45.  William H. Branson and Willem H.  Buiter, "Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
with Flexible Exchange Rates," Discussion Paper 95-81  (University of  Bristol, 
1981). Willem H. Buiter and Marcus Miller  351 
Table 12.  Cyclically Adjusted Public Sector Borrowing Requirement, 
Financial Years 1978-79  through 1982-83a 
Percent  unless  otherwise  specified 
Item  1978-79  1979-80  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83 
Public sector borrowing 
requirement  (billions of 
pounds sterling)  9.2  9.9  13.3  (9.5)  (8.8) 
Public  sector borrowing 
requirement/GDP  5. 5  5.0  5.9  (3.8)  (3.2) 
Cyclical  adjustmentb  0.0  0.0  -3.3  -5.3  n.a. 
Cyclically  adjusted  public 
sector borrowing  require- 
ment/GDP  5.5  5.0  2.6  -1.  5c  n.a. 
Memoranda 
GDP gapd  0.0  0.0  5.0  7.0  n.a. 
Unemployment  (average  for 
fiscal  year)  5.6  5.4  7.8  (10.9)  n.a. 
Inflatione  8.8  17.8  11.4  n.a.  n.a. 
Planned  public  sector  borrow- 
ing requirement/GDP 
March 1980  ...  ...  3.8  3.0  2.3 
March 1981  ...  ...  ...  4.3  3.3 
Sources:  Public  sector  borrowing  requirement  in  pounds  sterling-Bank  of  Eniglanid Quarterly  Review, 
vol.  21  (June  1981),  Statistical  Annex,  table  11.3;  and  Nationial  Inistitute  Econiomnic Review,  no.  96  (May 
1981),  p.  27  for  forecasts;  public  sector  borrowing  requirement/GDP,  GDP  gap,  and  unemployment- 
National  Institue  of  Economic  Research,  inflation-Econiomiiic  Trenids, no.  337  (November  1981),  p.  10; 
planned  public  sector  borrowing  requirement/GDP-United  Kingdom,  Finllancial Statemenlt  anld Budget 
Report,  1980-81  and  Finiancial  Statemenett and Budget  Report,  1981-82. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  The  numbers  in  parentheses  are  forecasts. 
b.  Cyclical  adjustment  is one-half  GDP  gap  plus  one-third  (unemployment  rate  -  5.4). 
c.  Surplus. 
d.  Assuming  1.75  percent  per  year  as  trend  GDP. 
e.  Growth  in the  consumers'  expenditure  deflator,  first  quarter  to  first  quarter. 
fiscal policy was expansionary in  1980-81;  such an impression is sup- 
ported by published figures of the National  Institute of  Economic  and 
Social Research showing a 2.4 percent increase in the "demand-weighted" 
deficit as a percentage of GDP.46  However, these ex post measures of the 
stance of fiscal policy are misleading and must both be corrected for the 
impact of the business downturn. 
46.  National  Institute Economic  Review,  no. 96  (May  1981),  p. 12. The weighted 
budget surplus or deficit figures reflect the direct GDP-creating or GDP-reducing 
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The cyclical adjustments to the PSBR itself are shown in table 12. As 
a simple rule of thumb, which appears to be consistent with the more 
elaborate procedures used by  the National  Institute of  Economic  and 
Social Research, we have assumed that taxes automatically decline  1/2 
percentage point of GDP  for every 1 point that GDP  falls beneath its 
trend, and that induced expenditure rises by  1/3  of  a point of GDP for 
every 1 point that unemployment increases. 
Starting with GDP at its last peak in fiscal 1979-80  and assuming a 
trend growth of GDP of  13/4  percent a year (which is halfway between 
the high and low assumptions made at the National Institute)  implies a 
gap of 5 percent for 1980-81,  and this is associated with an increase of 
about 2.4 points in the rate of unemployment. This leads to a "cyclical 
correction" of 3.3 percentage points in the PSBR/GDP  ratio, indicating 
that the PSBR would have fallen to less than 3 percent of GDP in 1980- 
81 if the economy had grown on trend, keeping unemployment constant.47 
For the current fiscal year the cyclical correction is estimated to be 5.3 
percentage points of GDP, which exceeds the planned deficit  (and the 
deficit projected by the National Institute), implying a cyclically adjusted 
surplus. The GDP gap for 1981-82,  using the GDP forecast made by the 
National Institute, is estimated to be 7 percent. This would ordinarily be 
associated with a rise of the unemployment percentage by about half as 
much from 1979-80  according to the version of Okun's law used in the 
United Kingdom, which worked well in 1980-8 1. But instead of rising by 
another point as the GDP gap widens in 1981, unemployment is forecast 
to increase by three points. 
The government has no plans to stabilize the economy along its poten- 
tial growth path. Therefore, as Okun himself reasons, one would not in 
such circumstances expect  the sort of  labor hoarding that his law  de- 
scribes.48  The rise in unemployment this year may thus be a demonstra- 
tion that Okun's law is subject to the Lucas critique-that  the behavior of 
the private sector varies according to its participants' perceptions of the 
government's policy rules. 
47. This correction exceeds that described in the Bank of  England Quarterly 
Bulletin, vol. 20  (September 1980),  p. 268, in which the PSBR/GDP  ratio is as- 
sumed to rise by just under half a percentage point for every point that GDP falls 
beneath  its trend. 
48.  Arthur  M. Okun, Prices  and Quantities:  A Macroeconomic  Analysis  (Brook- 
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Table 13.  Changes in the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement, 
Financial Years 1979-80  through 1981-82a 
Percentage  points 
Item  1979-80  1980-81  1981-82 
Change  in the public  sector borrowing 
requirement/GDP  ratio  -0.5  0.9  -2.  1 
Change  in the cyclically  adjusted  public  sector 
borrowing  requirement/GDP  ratio  -0.5  -2.4  -4.1 
Change  in the weighted  deficit/GDP ratio  -0.3  2.4  -2.5 
Change  in the weighted  deficit/GDP ratio 
after cyclical  adjustmentb  -0.3  -0.  1  -4.1 
Sources: Table 12, except for change in the weighted deficit  /GDP ratio, which is from National  histitute 
Econzomnic  Review, no. 96 (May 1981), table 6, p. 12. 
a.  A minus symbol indicates a reduction in the deficit as a percent of GDP. 
b. The change in the weighted deficit  /GDP ratio after cyclical adjustment is calculated from the cyclical 
adjustment in table 12. 
Four measures of the change in the fiscal balance are shown in table 13 
for 1979-80  and for the first two years of the MTFS. The changes in the 
PSBR/GDP  ratio are shown first, before and after adjusting for the cycle 
in the manner just described. The third row shows the changes in the 
demand-weighted deficit as a percent of GDP,  as published by the Na- 
tional Institute. After little change in 1979-80,  the weighted deficit was 
estimated to rise by 2.4  percent of GDP in the first year of the MTFS; 
but it is forecast to fall by 2.5 points in 1981-82.  These changes are to a 
large extent endogenous, however, with extra spending and less taxation 
reflecting the recession. When they, too, are corrected to remove the con- 
tribution of the automatic stabilizers, we find that, after a small contrac- 
tion in 1979-80,  the cyclically adjusted, demand-weighted deficit showed 
little change in 1980-81  when the government overshot its planned spend- 
ing targets, but will contract sharply if, as in the National Institute's fore- 
cast, the government achieves its PSBR targets in the second year of the 
MTFS.49 
The pessimism of the government's own assumptions as to the future 
path for output made in setting the course of fiscal policy is clear from the 
1980-81  and 1981-82  budget reports. In the first document the Chan- 
cellor made the deliberately cautious assumption that real GDP,  after 
falling by 2 percent in calendar year 1980, would then grow at an average 
rate of 1 percent a year during the next three years; in the second docu- 
49.  National  Institute  Economic  Review,  no.  96  (May  1981),  p. 27. 354  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1981 
ment, written when it was becoming more likely that there was to be little 
if any growth in calendar year 1981, the average growth rate projected 
for 1980-83  was reduced to 1/2 percent a year.50 
Thus the level of real GDP assumed for 1983 in designing the course 
of fiscal policy (with the PSBR supposed to fall to only 2 percent of GDP 
in 1983-84)  is below the level of GDP in 1979, despite the fact that oil 
and gas production is expected to grow from 21/4 percent of GDP in 1979 
to 41/2 percent of GDP during the four years in question, thus contribut- 
ing about 1/2 percent a year to the growth of GDP.51 
It is thus no surprise to find, as in table 13, that the net contribution of 
the government's programs to the growth of demand will, after the over- 
shooting of the PSBR targets is checked, fall far short of the economy's 
trend rate of growth. But by the same token, the authorities should expect 
unemployment to rise sharply under the MTFS, which assumes a growing 
shortfall of actual GDP relative to its potential trend. 
The principal reason given for the design of the fiscal policy appears to 
be the desire to avoid crowding out private investment if borrowing were 
to rise relative to GDP and the government adhered to its monetary tar- 
gets. The ratio of debt to GDP is affected not only by new borrowing but 
also by the change in the real value of the outstanding stock. The Bank of 
England does publish figures showing the change, due to inflation, in the 
real value of the existing stock of debt, valued at par. This adjustment for 
inflation is subtracted from the nominal PSBR to give what the Bank of 
England refers to as the real PSBR.52 Because the par value of govern- 
ment debt is approximately half that of GDP,  the inflation adjustment, 
expressed as a percent of GDP, is half a percentage point for each point 
of inflation. The Bank of England is, however, reluctant to ascribe much 
significance to the year-by-year timing of these adjustments, so we have 
not included them in our calculations above. In table  12, however, we 
show the rate of inflation over the financial year so that the reader will 
have some idea of what the adjustment  would be. 
In discussing its findings over a number of  years, the Bank of  En- 
gland observes: "In the early 1970s nominal public sector borrowing was 
more than offset by the erosion of the real value of existing liabilities, so 
50.  United  Kingdom,  Financial  Statement  and  Budget  Report,  1980-81,  p.  18; 
and Financial  Statement  and Budget Report,  1981-82,  p. 17. 
51.  Economic  Progress  Report,  no.  131  (March  1981),  p.  14. 
52. For a comprehensive discussion see C. T. Taylor and A.  R. Threadgold, 
"'Real' National Saving and Its Sectoral Composition,"  Discussion Paper 6 (Bank 
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that the public sector tended to be a 'real' net lender. But in recent years 
[1976-78],  in part reflecting the depressed economy,  the public sector 
has on average tended to be a small 'real' borrower. This finding is con- 
sistent with the decline in nominal national debt outstanding relative to 
current price GDP up to the mid-1970s,  and the rough stability of this 
relationship thereafter."53 
Although it appears from table  12 that the inflation-adjusted PSBR 
would be in deficit for  1980-81  when the PSBR target was exceeded, 
this is unlikely this financial year with a PSBR of between 3 and 4 percent 
of GDP and inflation above 10 percent. Indeed, it appears quite likely that 
the "real"  PSBR would be in surplus over the future of the MTFS, despite 
the recession. Thus, even if one believed his theoretical argument, the 
facts do not support Thomas Sargent's view that the MTFS is not credible 
essentially because it involves a forecast of deficits that will raise the ratio 
of debt to GDP and debt to money and thus will force the government to 
depart from its monetary rule.54  On the contrary, by expressing a target 
for nominal PSBR relative to GDP at a time of gradually slowing infla- 
tion, the MTFS promised to reduce the ratio of debt to GDP and to money 
as the government becomes a "real" lender!55 
Not only is the government seriously misjudging the degree of crowd- 
ing out attributable to its deficit, but also, to the extent that the capital 
losses on government debt affect aggregate demand as people save to re- 
store their asset holdings-what  Tobin calls the dynamic Pigou effect- 
the demand effects discussed above are too optimistic.56  Demand weight- 
ing the "real" PSBR would make fiscal policy  more restrictive than it 
appears on the basis of the nominal PSBR. 
Finally, going beyond  the  aggregate data, we  argue below  that the 
government's failure to cut taxes promptly in response to the rise in oil 
prices in OPEC-2 (the second OPEC oil price shock)  meant that incomes 
were transferred  from the nonoil sector to the oil companies in a way that 
53.  Bank  of  England  Quarterly Bulletin,  vol.  21  (June  1981),  p. 232. 
54. See Thomas J. Sargent,  "Stopping  Moderate  Inflation: The Methods of Poin- 
care and Thatcher" (University of Minnesota and Federal Reserve Bank of  Min- 
neapolis, May 1981); and Sargent and Neil Wallace, "The Fight against Inflation: 
How Much Can the Fed Do on Its Own?" (University of Minnesota and Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,  rev. August 1981). 
55. For further discussion see Marcus Miller, "The Medium Term Financial 
Strategy: An  Experiment in  Co-ordinating Monetary and Fiscal  Policy," Fiscal 
Studies,  vol.2  (July 1981), pp. 50-60. 
56. James Tobin, "Keynesian  Models of Recession and Depression,"  American 
Economic  Review,  vol.  65  (May  1975, Papers  and Proceedings,  1974),  pp.  195-202. Oi>S~~~~17  0  oo  N  O  tc  O  o  c  0  0  Xc  11  O  11  Nc 11 
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intensified the monetary squeeze on the company sector and the depth of 
the recession. 
Exogenous Factors 
The new Thatcher policies were imposed at a time when the external 
environment became unfavorable to price stability and growth. Table 14 
summarizes some of the developments that were important but largely 
exogenous to United Kingdom policy. The dollar price of oil rose by 45 
percent between  1978  and  1979  and by  a further 68  percent between 
1979 and 1980. The price of oil relative to traded manufactures rose 27 
percent and 52 percent in these two years. World trade grew by 7 percent 
between  1978 and 1979 but only  1.5 percent between  1979  and 1980. 
More relevant to the United Kingdom, the growth of world trade in manu- 
factures slowed from 5.7 percent to 4.6 percent in these two years. Start- 
ing in  1979,  the Eurodollar three-month interest rate fluctuated wildly 
around an upward trend. 
Although the unfavorable development in world trade and world in- 
terest rates undoubtedly contributed to the slump in output of the United 
Kingdom's economy, countries such as France and Germany faced these 
same external constraints without experiencing a recession of comparable 
magnitude. Also, if a decline in world demand for the output of the United 
Kingdom had been the major cause of its depression, it should not have 
led to the sharp appreciation of sterling and thus the loss of competitive- 
ness that actually occurred. The increase in world inflation during 1979 
and 1980,  as measured by the OECD consumer price index, shows that 
other industrial economies suffered price inflation from OPEC-2,  as did 
Britain. But this has no obvious implications for the depth of the depres- 
sion in the United Kingdom. 
The Impact of North Sea Oil on the United Kingdom's Economy57 
The  second  OPEC  oil  price shock  hit just  as the United  Kingdom 
evolved from being a large net importer of oil during most of the 1970s 
57.  Our analysis of the impact of oil owes a great deal to discussions with John 
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to self-sufficiency in  1980.  We now examine whether, as some have ar- 
gued, a major part of the loss of competitiveness of industry in the United 
Kingdom and the associated decline of industrial, and especially manu- 
facturing, production in  the  late  1970s  represents the  equilibrium re- 
sponse to the increase of domestic oil production and prices.58  In other 
words, can OPEC-2 be blamed for the extraordinary slump in the United 
Kingdom? 
It is important to distinguish between the effects on the United King- 
dom's wealth resulting from the discovery of North Sea oil and the effect 
of increases in the oil price once that discovery was made. The discovery 
of oil did increase wealth once the market price exceeded extraction costs. 
But even on the optimistic assumption that North Sea oil has made the 
United Kingdom just self-sufficient in oil indefinitely, further increases in 
its price do not change the real value of total wealth or total income for 
the economy, though those increases can alter the distribution of domestic 
income between consumers and oil producers. Higher oil prices do in- 
crease the United Kingdom's income and wealth vis-a-vis countries that 
are net oil importers and lower them relative to net oil exporters. 
OIL  AS  WEALTH 
The qualitative features of the equilibrium responses to an oil discovery 
are familiar. Compared to  what its position  would  have been  without 
domestic oil and with oil priced at its 1980 level, North Sea oil represents 
a transfer from nature to the United Kingdom equal to the present value 
of the oil rents (revenue net of extraction costs)  earned in the North Sea. 
Based on some illustrative revenue figures provided by Forsyth and Kay, 
the permanent income equivalent of these oil rents may amount to about 
3 percent of GDP in 1980.59 
Part of this increase in permanent income arising from oil discovery 
will be spent on domestic nontraded goods and on domestic tradables that 
are imperfect substitutes for foreign goods.  This leads to an increase in 
the relative price of nontraded goods and in the relative price of domestic 
58. See, for example, P. J. Forsyth and J. A. Kay, "The Economic Implications 
of North Sea Oil Revenues,"  Working  Paper 10 (London: Institute  for Fiscal Studies, 
August 1980). 
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to foreign traded goods.  Such a loss  of  competitiveness is the market- 
clearing, equilibrium response to an increase in the demand for domesti- 
cally produced goods facing a less than perfectly elastic supply schedule. 
Under plausible conditions resources would be drawn from the domestic 
tradables sector into both the nontradables and the oil  sector. While a 
relative contraction of production in the manufacturing sector is required 
if the relative price of nontradables rises, this relative decline need not 
necessarily be an absolute one in a growing economy. 
How  great a loss  of  competitiveness  might be  associated  with  this 
equilibrium response of discovery of North Sea oil? The import and ex- 
port elasticities that Forsyth and Kay use to generate their "central" esti- 
mate of 17.9 percent seem very pessimistic. The "low" Forsyth and Kay 
estimate is  8.2  percent.60 Even  this  estimate, however,  uses  values  of 
import and export elasticities that appear low. The boom in capital forma- 
tion that came with developing the North Sea oil fields may have strength- 
ened the pound sterling somewhat, apart from the equilibrium response, 
although most  of  this development  came before  the massive  1979-80 
appreciation and should not have affected the exchange rate in that period. 
OIL  AND  PORTFOLIO  INVESTMENT 
In the last few years sterling has reemerged as a significant part of 
international portfolios. The argument can be made that the discovery of 
domestic oil not only represents a windfall transfer from nature, but also 
safeguards the economy of the United Kingdom against the direct effects 
of certain kinds of economic calamities such as oil embargoes. (Spillover 
effects from less fortunate trading partners cannot be avoided in this way.) 
This could move the United Kingdom into a superior risk-class from the 
point of view of portfolio investment, lowering the required expected real 
rate of return on sterling portfolio investments. This portfolio shift hy- 
pothesis is consistent with the timing of the appreciation of sterling be- 
cause security against disaster through self-sufficiency is achieved only 
when actual oil production satisfies domestic requirements. 
Although it is virtually impossible to quantify this portfolio shift effect, 
it may well have contributed to the loss of competitiveness since 1979, but 
60. Ibid.,p. 30. 360  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1981 
it is doubtful that its contribution could be large. Together with the 8.2 
percent "low" estimate of the loss of competitiveness required to equili- 
brate the current account that was discussed above, these two channels 
through which oil would affect competitiveness cannot account for much 
of the 50 percent loss of competitiveness that actually occurred. 
OIL  PRICE  INCREASES  AND  COMPETITIVENESS 
Thus  far we  have  considered  the  effect on  competitiveness  of  the 
United Kingdom's oil endowments, valued at 1980  oil prices. We now 
turn to the effect that the increase in oil prices during 1978-80  may have 
had. Will an increase in world oil prices lead to a loss of competitiveness 
for a country like the United Kingdom? Ignoring substitution in demand 
away from oil and other energy products, the answer would seem to de- 
pend primarily on the country's degree of self-sufficiency in oil. Net oil 
importers must shift resources into the tradables sector to pay for the 
more expensive oil. A country self-sufficient in oil should have no prima 
facie  grounds for  altering the intersectoral allocation  of  its  resources. 
But, because many oil exporting nations do not have significant manu- 
facturing sectors, an oil  self-sufficient nation like Britain must, in fact, 
shift resources away from tradables. We would  therefore expect,  as  a 
result of OPEC-2,  some deterioration of United Kingdom competitive- 
ness  vis-a-vis  the  net  oil  importers-the  OECD  minus  Norway  and 
Canada, and the nonoil developing countries. 
FISCAL  ASPECTS  OF  OPEC-2 
The oil price increase has an important effect on the demand for capital 
and labor used in production and on the real wage and capital rentals that 
they can earn. Regardless of the country's position as an oil producer, the 
use of oil as an intermediate input in domestic production means that a 
decline in the real product wage (or marginal labor costs)  is required to 
maintain full employment. 
Real wage resistance-attempts  by workers to maintain a roughly con- 
stant standard of living in line with the nation's self-sufficiency in oil- 
would lead to some combination of unemployment and a further squeeze 
in nonoil profits. This appears to have happened in the United Kingdom Willem H. Buiter and Marcus Miller  361 
after OPEC-2. To avoid this, the appropriate fiscal response would have 
been a cut of employers' payroll taxes so as to lower marginal labor costs 
to employers to the level needed to maintain employment, without lower- 
ing the real wages demanded by workers. Such a tax cut could have been 
financed out  of  the  government's  current and  prospective  future  oil 
revenues. 
OIL  AS  CURRENT  INCOME 
With imperfect capital markets, the current flow of  oil  revenue as- 
sumes additional importance beyond its contribution to the present value 
of current and future oil revenue. It is here that the role of financial inter- 
mediation by the government during the buildup toward peak oil produc- 
tion becomes crucial. In the long run, most of the rents from oil will ac- 
crue to the government as tax revenue. Private agents are likely to be 
frustrated in their attempts to consume the permanent income equivalent 
of the oil revenue by their inability to borrow against the reduction in their 
future tax liabilities that is made possible by the oil revenues. The govern- 
ment could spend the additional revenue itself. But the present govern- 
ment's commitment to reduce public expenditure for structural reasons 
prevents it from following this course of action. Not subject to borrowing 
constraints in the capital markets, the government can remove borrow- 
ing constraints on private spending by implementing tax cuts in line with 
the perpetuity equivalent of its future North Sea oil revenues. However, 
the preoccupation with the current PSBR means that neither the govern- 
ment nor the private sector is spending in line with permanent income. 
The Causes of the Depression: A Summary 
We attribute the recent depression in the United Kingdom primarily to 
the effects of  restrictive monetary policy,  compounded  by  ill-designed 
fiscal policy. It must be recognized, however, that these contractionary 
policies were implemented in an unfavorable environment. The oil price 
increase of OPEC-2 and the slowdown in the growth of world trade, the 
latter to a large extent a consequence  of the former, were unfavorable 
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surge in  wage  settlements that  followed  the  collapse  of  the  previous 
Labour government's  incomes policy.61 
The  government established  the  credibility  of  its  restrictive policy 
stance at the start of its term of office. The perception that current and 
future monetary policy would be restrictive was reflected promptly in the 
exchange rate, interest rates, and financial markets generally, but only 
gradually in domestic costs, especially wages. This led to a major appre- 
ciation of the real exchange rate along the lines of the overshooting model, 
a rise in real interest rates, and a decline in Tobin's q. 
The restrictiveness of the chosen limits for monetary growth was inten- 
sified by the one-time increase in the price level associated with the switch 
from direct to indirect taxes, a part of the government's supply-side pack- 
age, and the exogenous rise in energy costs. Both these shocks came in 
addition to the underlying rapid rate of inflation inherited from the pre- 
vious government and the acceleration of wage settlements in the public 
sector to which the new Thatcher government acceded. 
The contractionary monetary policy was reinforced by the conduct of 
fiscal policy. The automatic fiscal stabilizers were overridden to  an in- 
creasing extent as the authorities tried to adhere to a set of fiscal plans 
that called for the PSBR to decline relative to GDP. As the economy fell 
progressively below its potential trend, and the permanent value of the 
government's North Sea oil revenues was neither spent by the authorities 
nor returned to the nonoil private sector in the form of tax cuts, this fiscal 
policy grew increasingly procyclical and restrictive. 
On the supply side, the oil price increase required a reduction in mar- 
ginal labor costs in order to maintain the competitiveness of business and 
thus employment. This reduction did not take place, presumably because 
of real wage resistance in the labor market. The government could have 
achieved the required reduction in labor costs despite real wage resistance 
by returning  its North Sea oil revenues to the private sector in the form of 
a cut in payroll taxes, such as the employers' national insurance surcharge. 
61. The current government has belatedly recognized the importance of public 
sector pay. It took a hard line during the Civil Service strike in the first half of 1981 
over its 7 percent  pay offer, and it has established  a 4 percent  pay norm for the com- 
ing public sector pay round. This stance represents  a major reversal of the complete 
disregard  with which these pay increases were treated in the early days of the ad- 
ministration.  With one-third of the labor force in the public sector, Britain will al- 
ways need at least one-third  of an incomes policy. Willem H. Buiter and Marcus Miller  363 
Failure to do this has worsened competitiveness and further squeezed the 
profitability of the nonoil sector. 
The fact that the decline in output can be largely accounted for by a 
decline in inventory investment deserves special comment. One possible 
explanation lies in the idea that it is "permanent"  or long run rather than 
current competitiveness that determines current export performance.62 
To the extent that a loss of competitiveness is expected to be transitory, 
as it would be in response to a nominal shock, exporters wishing to avoid 
the large setup costs of reentering foreign markets after a temporary with- 
drawal may choose to export even if this involves incurring losses in the 
short  run. Nonetheless,  domestic  output  will  decline  as  export-  and 
import-competing industries run down their inventories in response to the 
squeeze on corporate profitability, liquidity, and cash flow. 
Even if the loss  of competitiveness is not expected to be transitory, 
export volume will respond with a considerable lag-even  if new orders 
react fairly promptly.63 The  response of  producers in the  export-  and 
import-competing sectors in this case, too, is to cut back on new produc- 
tion and to meet outstanding orders by running down inventories. Finally, 
the increase in interest rates induced by tight money may be directly re- 
sponsible for some inventory decumulation. 
A Preliminary Assessment of the Thatcher Experiment 
No final verdict can be delivered yet on the Thatcher experiment, as it 
is still in progress. Whether the current depression has ultimately favor- 
able effects on business efficiency and productivity cannot be known for 
some time. Nor will it be known how much permanent improvement in 
inflation has been achieved until the economy has recovered. Although 
these and other ultimate goals cannot be evaluated, we can make some 
preliminary assessments of the Thatcher policies  and the results it has 
thus far produced and can offer some judgments about the future. 
62. See, for example, Patrick Minford, "A Rational Expectations Model of the 
United Kingdom under Fixed and Floating Exchange Rates," in Karl Brunner  and 
Allan  H.  Meltzer,  eds.,  On  the State  of  Macroeconomics,  Carnegie-Rochester  Con- 
ference Series on Public Policy, vol.  12 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1980),  pp. 
293-355. 
63. Jiirg Niehans, "The Appreciation  of Sterling-Causes,  Effects, and Policies," 
SSRC Money Study Group Discussion Paper (New York: Social Science Research 
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The policy has achieved three interim objectives. First, it has estab- 
lished the principle of  announcing government plans  for  expenditure, 
taxation, and financing for a much longer span of time than has been the 
case in the past. In principle this could, by reducing uncertainty about the 
future conduct of policy, improve the informational environment within 
which long-term private decisions  are made. This would be  especially 
valuable if it is uncertain policies rather than other, domestic or foreign, 
exogenous  shocks that account for most of  the randomness in the be- 
havior of the economy. 
Second, policy has emphasized the importance of the allocative, struc- 
tural, or supply-side effects of fiscal actions. Orthodox Keynesianism in 
the United Kingdom has tended to view fiscal policy almost exclusively 
as a means for regulating effective demand. 
Third, Mrs. Thatcher has given  a convincing  demonstration of  the 
powerful effect of tight monetary policy on an industrialized open econ- 
omy under a floating exchange rate and with a high degree of international 
capital mobility. To that extent, a monetary threat has been made more 
credible. She certainly has ended the virtually open-ended commitment 
to monetary accommodation of  domestic wage push that characterized 
much of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Our analysis has led to some fundamental criticisms of the design and 
implementation of policy thus far. Policymakers underestimated or ig- 
nored the adverse stabilization effects that the structural policy initiatives 
would have. The initial increase in the value  added tax,  for  example, 
hardly helped the fight against inflation; the imposition of  "external fi- 
nancing limits" on nationalized industries, which have significant monop- 
oly power, led them to raise prices so as to generate internal funds. There 
has been a failure to appreciate the changes in the nature of the transmis- 
sion mechanism that take place when the exchange rate is left to the mar- 
ket. In these circumstances, competitiveness is the first victim in the battle 
against inflation, and some of the anti-inflationary gains from the sharp 
early appreciation of the exchange rate will be lost later as the overshoot- 
ing unwinds and competitiveness is restored. 
The government's design and conduct of monetary policy was based on 
controlling the growth rate of sterling M3. Adopting a four-year target 
path for this version of "money" committed the government to attempt to 
control, almost unconditionally, an aggregate that has proved extremely 
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which the market correctly dismisses as cosmetic, or by pronounced move- 
ments in interest rates and shifts in fiscal policy, which have proved dam- 
aging to the real economy. If nominal intermediate targets are required, 
conditional targets for nominal interest rates or the nominal exchange rate 
would be more appropriate. Specifying policy in terms of contingent rules 
for such variables would be especially valuable if many of the shocks that 
buffet the economy originate in the private sector or overseas. 
To achieve its monetary targets without undue reliance on interest-rate 
fluctuations, the administration specified a path for the PSBR relative to 
GDP, which increasingly is preventing fiscal policy from playing its role 
as an automatic stabilizer. The problem of fiscal policy design has been 
exacerbated by the government's emphasis on  controlling the nominal 
PSBR. By not adjusting the PSBR for the effect of inflation on the real 
value of outstanding public sector debt, the authorities greatly overesti- 
mated the magnitude of financial crowding out-the  extent to which the 
public sector competes with the private sector for loanable funds. 
The government's cash-flow rather than present-value approach to the 
management of its North Sea oil rents means that oil-financed tax cuts 
have to wait until they can be paid out of concurrent government North 
Sea oil  receipts. The  latter will  not  reach their permanent value  until 
1982-83  at the earliest. The resulting unnecessary pressure on the stan- 
dard of living has put upward pressure on nominal wages. Payroll tax cuts 
would seem to be an efficient means for avoiding these kinds of problems. 
Finally, on the fiscal side, given the government's overall plans for public 
spending, the bias of current policy against capital formation in the public 
sector is damaging to long-run prospects for productivity and disinflation. 
The real costs in higher unemployment and lost output for reducing 
inflation have been increased by the failure to complement the general 
nonaccommodating stance of macroeconomic policy-a  threat to every- 
one in general and to no one in particular-with  measures aimed spe- 
cifically  and  directly  at  influencing wages,  whether  through  incomes 
policy or by reforming the British "nonsystem" of pay bargaining. Grant- 
ing public sector employees in  1979-80  an increase of  25  percent was 
hardly consistent with a commitment to a rate of growth of money of 7 to 
11 percent. Current discussion of more efficient ways of controlling the 
money supply through measures such as monetary base control are un- 
important relative to those institutional changes necessary to combat the 
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include decentralized, staggered, collective bargaining procedures whose 
emphasis on "catching up" and on restoring or improving differentials 
creates a mixed wage-price and wage-wage spiral with considerable mo- 
mentum. Designing incentives for individual firms and unions to make 
noninflationary  pay settlements, for example through a tax-based incomes 
policy, should have higher priority than designing more efficient ways of 
controlling some definition of the money supply.64 
The policies that created the depression in output have slowed infla- 
tion, at least for now. Most recently, wage settlements have been in single- 
digit figures. The depreciation of sterling since early 1981 has both per- 
mitted some improvement in margins and added to the price level. If the 
exchange rate now  stabilizes, price inflation may slow  to  single  digits 
during 1982. But the cost of improvement has been enormous. Without 
an incomes policy or radical reform of the pay bargaining system, a fur- 
ther lasting reduction in the rate of inflation is likely to require a further 
deflation of aggregate demand, a further fall in the level of output, and 
even some additional increase in unemployment. 
If incomes policy is deemed politically unacceptable, practically im- 
possible, or too costly in terms of the misallocation of resources it entails, 
and if labor market reform is not feasible, one alternative to further defla- 
tion might be "learning to live with" the current rate of inflation of about 
10 percent. More widespread indexation of  the tax and benefit system 
and additional widening of the portfolio of indexed public sector liabilities 
would be a step in that direction. Even the logic of monetarism suggests 
no theoretical or practical reasons for believing that the only sustainable 
steady rate of inflation is zero. Repeated assertion has been the only evi- 
dence given by the government for its claim that bringing down inflation 
is a prerequisite for lower unemployment and sustained growth. Ways 
such as paying interest on money can be found for minimizing the "shoe 
leather" costs of anticipated, steady inflation. 
If the government does change to a more expansionary fiscal policy in 
order to restore economic expansion, it should also adjust its monetary 
policy. Unchanged monetary targets would risk significant crowding out, 
not only through the direct effect of higher interest rates, but also through 
64.  For examples of tax-based  incomes policies see Richard Layard, "Is Incomes 
Policy the Answer to Unemployment?"  Discussion Paper 99  (London School of 
Economics and Political Science, Centre for Labour Economics, 1981); and Arthur 
M. Okun  and George L. Perry, eds., Cluring Chronic  Inflation (Brookings Institution, 
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appreciation of the real exchange rate and a squeeze on the internation- 
ally exposed sector. To avoid this, either monetary policy would have to 
accommodate the fiscal expansion or the free international flow of capi- 
tal would have to  be  suspended by  exchange  controls,  a real interest 
equalization tax, or some other set of administrative or fiscal measures. 
Alternatively, the authorities could replace their monetary target by an 
exchange rate target, say by joining the European Monetary System, and 
use fiscal policy to raise the level of capacity utilization. 
By setting anti-inflationary monetary targets and vigorously pursuing 
them despite the inflationary  pressures of 1979-80,  the government hoped 
to change the behavior of those who set wages and prices, making infla- 
tion more sensitive to such monetary policy announcements in the future. 
By selecting a monetary aggregate that proved too difficult to control and 
by failing to support this monetary objective with other policy actions that 
would help directly to bring down the rate of wage and price inflation, 
the  credibility of  such  monetary policy  announcements has  not  been 
enhanced; the behavior of sterling M3 has, on the contrary, become an 
enigma. Indeed, the spectacle of the government trying vainly to cut the 
PSBR in  an effort to  attain its ill-considered monetary targets led  Sir 
Ian Gilmour, until recently a member of the Cabinet, to define monetar- 
ism in its current manifestation as "the uncontrollable in pursuit of the 
indefinable." 
The government has presumably achieved anti-inflationary credibility 
of a more general kind. Its willingness to incur very large losses in output 
and employment to achieve a reduction in the rate of inflation has been 
established beyond  reasonable  doubt.  This,  rather than  the  narrower 
credibility of monetary targeting itself, may have created the conditions 
under which the future announcement and implementation of additional 
deflationary measures would be reflected in reductions in inflation with 
far smaller, if not negligible, losses of output and increases in unemploy- 
ment than have occurred in the past. We are skeptical about this because 
we believe that it would have taken more than even a credible change in 
the policy regime to eliminate the momentum in the wage-price process 
in the United Kingdom. Time will provide the answer if the government 
decides to continue its deflationary monetary and fiscal policies. Comments 
and Discussion 
Martin Neil Baily:  This paper contains a wealth of interesting informa- 
tion about recent economic policy and performance in the United King- 
dom. Most of the important ideas and facts are discussed, although both 
theory and evidence could have been marshaled more effectively to sup- 
port the hypotheses advanced. 
The Conservative government that took office in June 1979 inherited 
an economy that was in very poor shape. Double  digit inflation was ac- 
celerating. The level of productivity was low relative to most of Britain's 
European  partners. General  government  expenditures were  extremely 
large, at a level  that necessitated very high effective rates of  taxation. 
Strikes and industrial unrest were a serious problem, particularly in the 
government-controlled industries in which workers in vital sectors found 
that their ability to  disrupt the  economy  had  given  them  tremendous 
monopoly power over wages. The nationalization of industries, which is 
supposed to increase democratic control over the economy,  apparently 
achieves the opposite. 
It is not at all clear that remedies for these problems existed that could 
have  succeeded  within the time-horizon  allowed  by  the  political  con- 
straints. Mrs. Thatcher is to be commended for seeing that major changes 
were needed and for having the political courage to attempt them. Willem 
Buiter and Marcus Miller come close to declaring Mrs. Thatcher's policies 
a failure only twenty-seven months after she took office. And much of her 
own political party is ready to do the same. The electorate gave up long 
ago. On the centerpiece of her program-stopping  inflation-I  think it is 
too early to render a final judgment, but there is now some evidence of 
improvement. It is certainly true that the costs in terms of output and un- 
employment of the first two years have been very high. 
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Buiter and Miller analyze the events of  1979 to  1981 within a sticky 
wage  and price framework and the  basic  argument about what  went 
wrong is fairly straightforward.  Contractionary monetary and fiscal policy 
reduced  the  level  of  nominal  demand.  Since  wages  and  prices  were 
sticky, this translated into a decline in real output, an increase in unem- 
ployment, and a moderate abatement of inflation. This is a sensible story; 
surely there is a substantial core of truth to it. The  story of Britain in 
1980-81,  like the story of the U.S. economy in  1975, is that systematic 
contractionary policy does indeed reduce real output. But I would also 
stress, first, that the rise in the sterling exchange rate was probably not 
purely a result of monetary policy and, second, that both the accelerating 
wage-push inflation after 1978 and the second OPEC price shock in 1979 
exerted upward pressure on prices and downward pressure on output- 
in ways I discuss below. Bad luck has compounded the effects of policy 
and  turned what  was  probably  a  necessary  recession  into  a  ghastly 
depression. 
On fiscal policy, the authors argue that the budget deficit, which has 
been of such concern to the government, in fact has been caused by the 
recession, and once  the appropriate adjustments have been made, final 
policy can be shown to be slightly contractionary. The authors' analysis 
looks sound. 
Most of the attention of the Thatcher experiment has been focused on 
monetary policy because of Mrs. Thatcher's monetarist convictions. Here 
it turns out to be very hard to read the signals correctly. That fact in itself 
is of importance for monetarism, which is supposed to provide a simple 
policy rule and a predictable outcome. Alternative measures of the nomi- 
nal money stock diverged sharply. However, the real money stock, by all 
measures, fell in 1979-80.  Nominal interest rates rose dramatically, and 
ex post real interest rates fell or rose, depending on what price index one 
uses. Because  the surge in the price level  was  a surprise and was not 
expected to become a permanently higher inflation rate, ex ante expected 
real rates of interest were probably high. 
Buiter and Miller argue that the narrow Ml  measure of money is better 
than the broader M3 measure (used by the government in its setting of 
targets) and hence that the sharp deceleration of Ml  growth indicates a 
tight policy. Frankly, I do not know how to evaluate the status of mone- 
tary policy in a simple way because the financial institutions have been 
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the price level. The most striking fact in table 8 is the decline in the real 
money stock by all measures. By refusing to accommodate the change in 
the price level, the government in a sense acquiesced in a very tight mone- 
tary policy. 
A topic of great interest to Buiter and Miller is the role of the foreign 
trade sector and the exchange rate in the decline of output and employ- 
ment. The value of sterling rose sharply compared with Britain's major 
trading partners. Since wages were also rising rapidly, the result was that 
the International Monetary Fund's index of relative unit labor costs for 
the United Kingdom was up 40  percent in 1980  over  1978.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, this dramatic change in competitiveness  did not  show up 
very strongly in import or export volumes.  There was  some  slight in- 
crease in the ratio of imports to GDP, and the changing position of the 
United Kingdom with respect to oil imports and exports had an effect. 
Nonoil  exports were weakening, but not by that much. The mechanism 
that Buiter and Miller say caused the downturn works through profitabil- 
ity and inventories. When manufacturing in the United Kingdom became 
uncompetitive, firms continued to sell overseas to preserve market share 
in the hope that sterling would soon fall. But because their profits were 
squeezed, these firms cut production, cut investment, and liquidated in- 
ventories. The inventory swing in particular was quite large. Just to quib- 
ble, I would point out that inventory swings are usually very large in a 
business cycle downturn, even when foreign trade is not important. This 
would have been especially true in a tight-money recession. The authors' 
assertion about the importance of trade is probably correct; it almost has 
to be correct. But it is surprising  that it does not stand out in the data. 
If one accepts that the exchange rate was important, the next question 
is, what caused the pound to rise instead of fall as domestic wages and 
prices rose? Buiter and Miller agree that an increase in the world price of 
oil should raise the exchange rate of the United Kingdom relative to coun- 
tries that are not  self-sufficient in oil.  But the oil  shock in itself,  they 
argue, can only explain a small part of the upward movement of sterling. 
Again, this is probably correct, but their discussion is fairly casual. 
Their view of the exchange rate is based upon the Dornbusch over- 
shooting model; that is, it is seen as a consequence of tight money in a 
sticky wage economy. The Dornbusch model, instructive though it is in 
many ways, does not really explain why exchange rate movements around 
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$2.39  at the end of 1980 and has subsequently dropped as low as $1.80. 
It is hard to see enough in interest rate changes or other fundamentals to 
cause a decline of this magnitude. This makes one suspect that the initial 
rise of sterling to $2.39 was also partially a speculative swing. The loss of 
United Kingdom competitiveness in 1979-80  seems to have been partly 
a result of unwarranted confidence in British economic performance by 
foreign exchange traders. 
The long-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation that re- 
sulted from the decline in aggregate demand has not yet been revealed. 
The crucial test for the Thatcher policy  should be whether or not full 
employment can be restored with price stability. That test may never be 
passed or failed because of the political time-horizon. 
The short-run trade-off has been adverse for a variety of reasons. First, 
Mrs. Thatcher inherited an accelerating inflation as the Labour govern- 
ment's incomes policy collapsed. Second, the shift from income taxes to 
value added taxes affected at least the standard consumer price index more 
or less by the full amount of the increase in value added taxes. Third, the 
price of OPEC oil increased. Fourth, the large public sector was given a 
massive pay increase. A substantial part, but not all, of the inflation bubble 
of 1979-80  was, therefore, caused by self-inflicted policy wounds. Since 
1980 the slowdown in inflation is beginning to look much more encourag- 
ing. So it should, given the massive increase in unemployment. But at least 
the refusal to accommodate inflationary wage settlements is having an 
impact on the size of those settlements. This effect did not occur by any 
magical alteration of expectations but by the old-fashioned threat of bank- 
ruptcy and joblessness. The real question for the future is whether or not 
wage inflation will reaccelerate when or if full employment is restored. 
My overall assessment of the Thatcher experiment differs in emphasis 
from that of Buiter and Miller. They are correct that there is much to 
criticize. It was foolish to abandon the stabilization of the real economy 
and to take actions that raised the price level; but the inherited situation 
was so bad that a very difficult economic period was inevitable. Some part 
of the depression was not Mrs. Thatcher's fault. Some fairly drastic mea- 
sures to revive the private sector and scale down the public sector were 
called for. 
I turn now to a question of interest for U.S. macroeconomists: to what 
extent does  the  British experiment help  to  decide  the  validity  of  the 
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cently written a fascinating exposition of his view of the Thatcher experi- 
ence  thus far, and I  think it is worthwhile contrasting his  views  with 
those of Buiter and Miller.' 
Sargent argues that Mrs. Thatcher's election did not represent a policy 
regime change and that it is, therefore, not surprising that the tight mone- 
tary policy that she introduced caused a decline in real output. Sargent 
also emphasizes the importance of the exchange rate and discusses the 
Dornbusch overshooting model.  In many ways,  therefore, the  Sargent 
analysis agrees with the conclusions of Buiter and Miller. The big differ- 
ence is that Sargent argues that with different preconditions the real costs 
could have been avoided. In particular, he argues that substantial budget 
deficits undermined confidence in the ability of the government to main- 
tain monetary control in the future. In fact this is the key point he makes. 
Fiscal responsibility is essential to a regime change. 
I must say my sympathy goes to Mrs. Thatcher at this point. She was 
told that salvation lies in strict monetary control. She followed this advice, 
or tried to, and was hit by a massive recession. A consequence  of the re- 
cession was and is a large deficit, but she is now told that the reason her 
policies are not working is because of the deficit. I simply do not believe 
that the budget deficits pushed the public debt to the point that monetiza- 
tion will become inevitable. For one thing, the prospective North Sea oil 
tax revenue will provide the resources to service any current increases in 
debt. 
More fundamentally, though, I do not see why irreversibility is impor- 
tant in the rational expectations models.  Sargent's new classical model 
asserts that anticipated policy has no effect on real output. It says nothing 
about whether policies  are maintained or  reversed.  On  the  contrary, 
anticipated  stop-go  policies  allegedly  have  no  effect  on  real  output. 
Sargent must claim, therefore, that economic  agents did not know that 
Mrs. Thatcher was going to begin with tight money. Why would people 
who had rational expectations impose upon themselves serious real costs 
in 1980-81  just because Mrs. Thatcher might be thrown out of office in 
1984 or even in 1982? Moreover (a debater's point, perhaps), if the tight 
monetary policy  had reduced prices without serious real output costs, 
Mrs. Thatcher would have been a heroine and the policy would certainly 
not have been reversed, at least in the near future. The only arguments 
1. Thomas J. Sargent, "Stopping  Moderate Inflation: The Methods of Poincare 
and Thatcher"  (University of Minnesota and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 
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that a rational expectations economist can make about the British experi- 
ence, it seems to me, are either that the tight policy was a surprise or that 
the recession was caused principally by exogenous shocks, for example 
a terms-of-trade adjustment that caused structural problems. The first of 
these arguments is almost absurd. The second has not yet been made, and 
it rather undermines the general rational expectations  hypothesis  that 
economic fluctuations are caused by unanticipated policy actions. 
Finally, I consider briefly what British policy should be from now on. 
First, stop worrying about the deficit in the short run and avoid contrac- 
tionary fiscal policy. Once the economic situation improves, a program to 
scale down the size of government will seem easier to accomplish. Second, 
stop concentrating on a single indicator of monetary policy and use infor- 
mation on  all money  stocks and interest rates to  determine how  tight 
policy is. Allow a gradual recovery of demand. Having come this far it is 
important to maintain the principle that unions cannot expect excessive 
wage increases to be validated. If that is given up now, the costs will be 
very high. Third, given that the government has demonstrated that ulti- 
mately it does have the power to limit wage inflation, it may be that a 
sensible incomes policy could help the restoration of full employment and 
price stability. The heavy unemployment costs of demand restraint make 
it worthwhile to look for better incomes policies than those of the past. 
William H. Branson:  The paper presents a clean and sensible analysis of 
the recession in the United Kingdom and its source in the monetary and 
fiscal policies adopted by the Thatcher government. It presents a surpris- 
ing fact-that  as of  late  1981  the recession was  an inventory sale.  It 
shows  the  important  influence  of  monetary  policy  on  the  economy 
through the real exchange rate along lines sketched by Dornbusch and 
Krugman in Brookings Papers a few years ago.'  The paper also brings 
together data on the recession in an exposition that will be fascinating 
reading for U.S. macroeconomists. The one point that I will question in 
this comment is the evaluation of the Thatcher experiment. The discus- 
sion seems a bit ambiguous about the criteria for evaluation. I think the 
jury has to remain out in this case for some time to come. In the com- 
ments that follow, I briefly discuss the analysis of the recession and then 
come to the evaluation of the Thatcher experiment. 
The numbers on monetary policy are summarized in table 8. The real 
1.  Rudiger  Dornbusch  and  Paul  Krugman,  "Flexible  Exchange  Rates  in  the 
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monetary base has been shrinking since 1979:3.  Sterling M3 contracted 
in real terms from 1979:3  to  1980:2,  but growth picked up by  1981. 
These money growth figures may look tight by some standards, but they 
do not indicate lower real money growth than the United States experi- 
enced over the same period. 
Another indicator of monetary tightness is real interest rates, which are 
summarized in table 9. If the nominal yield on twenty-year government 
securities is compared with the concurrent rate of increase of the retail 
price index, one can see negative real rates from 1979:3  to the end of 
1980.  Thus the data on interest rates do not indicate particularly tight 
money,  either. Perhaps the  increases in bankruptcies and liquidations 
shown in table 10 are better indicators of the monetary squeeze. 
It is hard, on balance, to read the evidence as showing extremely tight 
money up to early 1981. It may be that the perception of the public that 
the government intended to tighten led to an expectations-based recession. 
While  the  exchange  rate  had  been  appreciating  even  before  the 
Thatcher government, it went  through an enormous real  appreciation 
from mid-1979  to the beginning of 1981. This is shown in table 4. From 
1979:2  to 1980:4,  the nominal effective exchange rate appreciated about 
15 percent. Relative unit labor costs  in domestic currency went up by 
another 19 percent. So relative unit labor costs expressed in a common 
currency rose by 34 percent. The sterling appreciation in nominal terms 
added to an inflation running ahead of the competition. The consequence 
of this was the deep recession illustrated in table 1. 
Where did the recession appear in the demand categories of table 2? 
From 1979 to 1980, fixed investment fell by 2 percent in real terms. The 
quarterly data in the bottom half of the table tell the real story, though. 
From a peak of ?21.2 billion in 1979:4,  real investment fell to ?19.0 bil- 
lion by  1981:1,  a drop of more than 10 percent. Thus the cumulative 
effect of the expected money squeeze is building, even though it does not 
appear to be strong in the annual GNP data. 
Government and private consumption have continued to increase in 
real terms. The annual data show exports rising a bit from 1979 to 1980, 
but the quarterly data show a drop from a peak of ?33.9  billion sterling 
in  1980:1  to ?32.3  billion  in  1980:4.  Thus the real appreciation may 
have been cutting into exports by mid-1980. 
The  big drop in  GNP  has  come  in  the  inventory sellout  shown in 
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in GNP. The explanation in the paper runs from tight money and cash- 
flow problems to liquidation and inventory run-down, and finally produc- 
tion cuts and unemployment. The open-economy aspect of the inventory 
depletion is an important part of the picture. The increase in relative unit 
labor costs in the export industries, working against prices constrained by 
international competition,  squeezes profits even more severely than in 
"sheltered" domestic industry. For a time, export sales are met from in- 
ventory, but eventually they begin to fall. This is consistent with the data 
of table 2. 
What about the outlook? Table 4 shows the beginning of the rebound 
in competitiveness. As of August 1981 the sterling effective exchange rate 
was 91.3, back to its level in 1979:3.  At the same time, domestic currency 
unit labor costs have gone up in the United Kingdom relative to the com- 
petitors, so the loss of competitiveness arising from that source remains 
in the real exchange rate. 
The sterling-dollar exchange rate is back to 1.82 (in September 1981). 
It was $2.06 the day the Thatcher government took office. It can be seen 
in the exchange rate numbers that the effective exchange rate is back to 
its  1979:3  value, but sterling, in terms of  the dollar,  has moved from 
$2.06  to $1.84  from 1979:2  to  1981:3.  This shows that the dollar has 
been  appreciating relative to  all currencies, not  that sterling has been 
depreciating. 
There remains a real appreciation of sterling, and fall in real exports 
and investment as of late 1981. This makes the outlook one of deepening 
recession into 1982. 
Finally, I turn to the evaluation of the Thatcher experiment, which I 
find somewhat tricky. On very narrow grounds this policy might be said 
to have failed because of the selection of the wrong monetary aggregate 
to control. One could say that the policy failed because the government 
tried to control an aggregate that is uncontrollable. If the policy failed on 
these grounds, there would not be any reason to present a long paper 
with an extensive discussion of unemployment and depression. One would 
simply show that policy used the wrong instrument. But I have the feeling 
that this is not the whole answer. Suppose the right monetary aggregate 
had been chosen? 
If the point of the experiment is to show that the monetary targets will 
be maintained in order to make future policy more effective, it seems to 
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vince the labor market participants that policy will persist. So the exis- 
tence of  a deep  recession  would  not  be  convincing  evidence  that  the 
Thatcher experiment has failed. The very existence of the recession might 
be required to make it succeed. 
I am a little uneasy about this definition of the Thatcher experiment 
and this way of deciding whether or not it has failed. I would prefer a 
definition that states what has been implicit: that the announcement of 
adherence to  monetary targets would  bring down  the rate of  inflation 
without  causing excessive  costs.  The  level  of  costs  that  are excessive 
would have to be as defined by the Thatcher government in order to avoid 
the trap of saying that the experiment has failed because the government 
fails to accept my social judgments about the cost of unemployment. 
Furthermore, to be fair, one should count just those costs that occurred 
and that were a predictable result of the policy. If it was not predictable, 
one might regard the recession as the luck of the draw and not an indica- 
tion that the policy has failed. Thus far the recession has come mainly in 
the form of a big inventory drop. With a high inventory-sales ratio and a 
small drop in investment spending, a large swing in inventory accumula- 
tion can occur; but that is difficult to forecast. So it is not clear how much 
of the present recession is a predictable result of the policy. Buiter and 
Miller might well not have predicted what is happening if they had, in the 
third quarter of  1979,  made a forecast of  the economy  of  the United 
Kingdom conditioned on the Thatcher policies that actually evolved. 
All  of  this is  to  say that the failure of  the particular model  of  the 
economy implicit in the Thatcher experiment is hard to prove, at least 
from this paper. It remains true that the recession has gone beyond what 
anyone had expected publicly. And, in my opinion, it has gone much too 
far. It is a fair criticism that economic performance has been dismal. But 
the jury is still out on the Thatcher experiment, whatever the experiment 
is. 
General Discussion 
Several discussants suggested that the  1979  oil price shock  and the 
availability of  substantial oil  resources in Britain may have  played  a 
larger role in  the British recession  than that suggested by Buiter and 
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exchange rate is a consequence of tight money. He suggested that the size 
of the British oil reserves only began to be recognized after 1976, and the 
effect of these reserves on the sterling exchange rate was still growing at 
the time Mrs. Thatcher took office. Peter Kenen emphasized that even 
though the real income of the United Kingdom may not have been directly 
affected by the 1979 oil price rise, its position relative to other industrial 
countries that were oil importers was affected, and this could have appre- 
ciated the pound. Furthermore, the occurrence of OPEC-2 demonstrated 
the value of Britain's self-sufficiency, and this would have had immediate 
impacts on the exchange rate. Jeffrey Sachs emphasized that, although 
OPEC-1 and OPEC-2 posed similar stabilization problems for industrial 
nations, the responses of policy  and labor were not the same on each 
occasion and have not been the same in different countries. In Britain the 
principal difference between the two periods is that the authorities accom- 
modated the shock with expansionary monetary policy  in  1974,  while 
there was less accommodation in 1980 and, consequently, a much smaller 
increase in inflation and a greater loss of  output. Sachs further argued 
that the nominal wage explosion taking place when Mrs. Thatcher took 
office represented an even more serious supply shock than the 1979 oil 
price rise. Real wages rose much faster in Britain than in other major 
industrial countries and for that reason the recession in Britain was much 
more severe. 
There was some disagreement about the way monetary policy is con- 
ducted in the United Kingdom, even given the government's own high 
priority on stopping inflation. Marris agreed with Buiter and Miller that 
in selecting sterling M3, the Bank of England chose the wrong monetary 
instrument. But he observed that whenever a monetarist policy is found 
not to work the monetarist conclusion is that the wrong technical tool 
was chosen. Nicholas Kaldor disagreed that sterling M3 was an unfortu- 
nate monetary target. While certainly not a good indicator for policy, all 
the other monetary alternatives are worse. In particular, while the govern- 
ment has only limited control over sterling M3,  it has no control at all 
over the supply of Ml.  Kaldor also disagreed with the authors' contention 
that monetary policy was tight. While agreeing that the government in- 
tended a tight monetary policy,  he pointed out that bank credit to  the 
private sector has gone up faster under Mrs. Thatcher than it did in pre- 
vious years, as shown by the fact that the money supply (M3)  increased 
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increased at an annual rate of 11.2 percent during the previous five years. 
Borrowers had access to credit and did not complain. While interest rates 
have been  higher under Mrs. Thatcher, inflationary expectations  have 
been higher also, thus mitigating their effects. 
Sachs thought the  authors were disingenuous in  complaining  about 
Mrs. Thatcher's neglect of incomes policies because such policies  have 
been  thoroughly repudiated by  unions  and  are unpopular  across  the 
political  spectrum. Moreover,  previous  incomes  policies  have  worked 
only briefly and have always been followed by price explosions.  Kaldor 
suggested that Mrs. Thatcher has actually made a reversal on incomes 
policy by announcing that public-sector employees-who  constitute one- 
third of all employees-can  receive wage increases of only 7?/2 percent 
this year and 4 percent next year. Given the size of the public sector, this 
will exert substantial pressure on private wage settlements. Marcus Miller 
agreed that the public-sector pay proposal amounts to back-door incomes 
policy,  thus increasing the likelihood  that such  a policy  may become 
politically feasible. He also noted that the political system may be evolv- 
ing in such a way that the opposition to such policies by both labor unions 
and conservative politicians will be less important than it has been. 
In assessing the overall success of  the Thatcher experiment, Kaldor 
remarked that the program could only be considered successful if eco- 
nomic growth and high employment are restored and accompanied by 
much less inflation than there would have been otherwise. So far there is 
no evidence of this or, indeed, of any recovery in the near future, though 
the cost of the policies has been the largest drop in British manufacturing 
output ever observed. Sachs argued that Mrs. Thatcher's policies have to 
be evaluated against the problems of the oil price shock and wage explo- 
sion. These and the nonaccommodative response to them are the major 
causes of the British recession. The policy should be credited with avoid- 
ing an acceleration of inflation like the one that accompanied the accom- 
modation of the OPEC-1 shock. 
James Tobin noted that the Thatcher program is as close  as we  are 
likely to come to an experiment testing the Fellner strategy of the credible 
threat. Tobin said that, as a social scientist, he would not like to interrupt 
this experiment now before its efficacy and cost have been tested. More- 
over, it would seem foolish to stop a program that might be on the verge 
of success after the huge costs incurred over the past two years. Tobin 
then noted an essential difference between the disinflation strategies pur- Willem H. Buiter and Marcus Miller  379 
sued  in  the  United  States  and  the  United  Kingdom.  Although  Mrs. 
Thatcher has been quite explicit in publicly announcing the costs that her 
economic policies would entail if the private sector persisted in inflation- 
ary wage and price behavior, the president of the United States has left to 
Murray Weidenbaum and Paul Volcker  the job  of  explaining the un- 
pleasant consequences that his policies will have if inflation does not slow. 
U.S. policy is missing the clear articulation of the threat that it entails and 
consequently is much less effective as a Fellner strategy. 